An Analysis of Shoonyavaada and Mayavaada

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - Conclusion

2006-05-21T11:14:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM

Prostrations to all.

Finally we have come to an end to this thread of Shoonyavada and Mayavaada.

While concluding, we will first try to see the Upanishadic statements which clearly say that Brahman is not shoonya but a really existent entity.

Taittiriya Upanishad says
Satyam Jnaanam Anantham Brahma
Existence, Consciousness and infiniteness is what is called Brahman

Katha Upanishad says
Naiva vaacha na manasaa prapthum shakyo na chakshushaa
Astheethi broovatho anyatram katham tad upalabhyathe

Brahman is not attainable through the organs of action (speech etc.) or through the mind or through the organs of perception starting from eyes, ears etc. That which is realized as “I Exist, I Exist”, how can person realize it somewhere else??? (Meaning that the Self is realized as one’s own existence – Chaitanya which has sphuranam of I-exist, I-exist each moment).

There are many other upanishadic statements also which clearly mention the reality of Brahman as something which is really existent.

Gita too says thus:
Na tad bhaasayathe sooryo na shashaanko na paavakah
Yad gatvaa na nivarthanthe tad dhaama paramam mama

There (in the state of Brahman), the sun doesn’t shine nor does the moon or fire. That is the state reaching where a person never returns again.

The above sloka is a clear example to show that the reality of Lord or Brahman or “I” (Krishna means Brahman by the word “I” and not the form-Lord Vishnu) is something existent and not shoonya (devoid of any existence).

Puranaas too say
Satchidaananda roopaaya vishwa utpatyaadi hetave
Taapatraya vinaashaaya sri krishnaaya vayam namaha

I prostrate Lord Krishna of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss – who is the cause of the creation etc. (etc. means protection and destruction) of the world – who is remover of the three types of obstacles or sorrows (adhibhootam, adhidaivam and adhyaatmam).

Thus Sruthi, Smrithi and Puranaas clearly mention the reality as being EXISTENT and not as a shoonyam.

Here the dvaitin will argue that “The Upanishads do propound an existing entity but the nirguna Brahman, claimed as the reality in the scriptures as per Advaita, is non-existent and same as shoonya”. This is but a wrong accusation. On the first case, Advaita gives Brahman the nature of SAT, CHIT and ANANDA. And Advaita very clearly accepts SAT as that which is existent for the three periods of time (that which never ceases to exist).

Vidyaranya thus says in Panchakosha viveka in Panchadashi (while explaining Satyam jnaanam anantham brahma):

Satyatvam baadha raahityam jagad bhaadaika saakshinah
Baadhah Kim sakshiko broohi na tu asaakshika ishyathe

Satyatva means that which is devoid of cessation (BADHA means sublation – eg: is the snake being sublated when rope is known) and that which is the witness to the cessation of the world. If it is asked what is the witness to the SAKSHI which also can be sublated --- this is wrong as there need to be a sakshi for all sublation & this sakshi is never sublated.

We all experience this also that at all times, that “I” never ceases to exist. Even if the sruthi or scriptures cease to exist – still “I” exist. Even when the Brahman ceases to exist, “I” exist. Here there will be a problem that Brahman becomes non-eternal if “I” and Brahman are not the same. This fault is not there only in Advaita which accepts Brahman and “I” as same. This “I” is not the Lord also because it is the individual “I” as per the Dvaita system. We will not enter into criticism of Dvaita system as that is not what is meant here but just defending of Advaita. Thus SAKSHI bhaavam which is something that “EXISTS” is there in Advaita. This existent entity is Brahman or the ultimate reality behind the illusory world.

But as per Shoonyavaadins the shoonyam is something which is non-existent & this reality is experienced when the differentiation between the thinker, thinking and object of thinking (called Triputi) vanishes. Advaita too says that when these three vanish, the reality of Brahman is realized. But the difference is in the nature of the ultimate reality – which is an EXISTENT VASTHU in Advaita where is a non-existent SHOONYA in Shoonyavaada.

As shown in the above panchadashi sloka, there are many other slokas in Panchadashi where Vidyaranya criticizes Shoonyavaada. Sureshwaracharya in his Manasollasa commentary on Sankaracharya’s Dakshinamurthy astakam too criticizes the shoonya vaada system.

Sankara says thus in Dakshinamurthy astakam

Deham praanam api indriyaani api chalaam buddhim cha shoonyam viduh
Stree baala andha jadopamaah tu aham ithi branthah brisham vaadinah

There are certain people who claim that “I” am the body, pranaas, indriyaas, changing intellect (the kshanika vijnaanavaada school of Buddhism) and Shoonyam – these are mad people who are like women, children and blind who have the illusion and based on this illusion scream about this wrong knowledge (here women is mentioned just to show the women tendencies to believe things which are not real and easily falling for things – not the gender is mentioned here but the qualities of women is being mentioned – there may be men among women & women among bearded ones too).

Thus Sankara himself criticizes the shoonyavaada school. Sri Harsha in his khandana khanda khaadyam as well as Chitsukha in his Chitsukhi criticize Nagarjuna (the propounder of the Madhyamaka school of shoonyavaada) for not ascertaining the existent reality even though he accepts the traikaalika satta, illusory nature of world etc.

Even though both systems are proved as very different, yet there are people who criticize Advaita and claim it as “Pracchanna baudhaas” (veiled Buddhists) taking resort to some puranaa statement. The people (the dvaitins) who accept this puranic statement but themselves accept that the puranaas including Bhagavatham have lot of interpolation in them. This is the reason why Madhvacharya wrote the Bhagavata tatparya Nirnaya so that such interpolations are removed. It is but absurd to claim one thing and to follow the same thing in a different way. Even though puranaas are considered interpolated but the dvaita import statements and statements refuting advaita are accepted. Isn’t this narrow-mindedness????? For eg:- all including the ISKCON people accept that Bhagavatham is a dualistic work about the form Lord & propounds Bhakthi but consider the last few slokas in Bhagavatham which clearly say that the Brahma Atma Aikya jnaana of Upanishads alone is the import of Bhagavatham and this is Jnaanam alone (this sloka mentions the seekers of reality as Vaishnavaas). These last slokas are commented by Sridhara swamin in his commentary on Bhagavatham (this is the oldest commentary on Bhagavatham written around the 13th century).

Thus it is wrong to claim that Brahman of Advaita is shoonya. The Brahman as Nirguna, Nirvishesha reality is clearly propounded in the Upanishads. This Brahman even though is beyond words and thoughts but is still experienced intuitively through Aparoksha Anubhava as one’s own very nature of Consciousness. This Brahman is the Subject of all objects – the Subject which never becomes an object. This Subject of one’s own very nature of Consciousness never ceases to exist (as Sruthi, yukthi and anubhava clearly prove it). Thus this Subject of Nirguna, Nirvishesha, Niraakaara Brahman is not the same as shoonya of shoonyavaadins.

We have already discussed in the previous sections as to how the objections raised by the Dvaitin are not only correct but completely wrong. Thus it can be concluded that Brahman is something which is really existent & is the reality behind the illusory duality that is currently perceived. Brahman is one’s own very nature of Consciousness – ever-existent entity.

People like BNK Sharma and others vainly fight with each other in the name of philosophy claiming that “the dvaita acharyas” have very well defined Advaita in the purvapaksha statements correctly & hence they are not misinterpreting or wrongly understanding Advaita – this claim is completely wrong as most of the arguments raised are merely based on assumptions and not clearly understanding the fundamentals of Advaita Vedanta. Even though BNK Sharma and others claim to refute Advaita using high-end logics in Nyaayaamritam, “I” have personally not seen even a single logic against the anirvachaneeya or indescribability of the world as different from Sat and Asat. They use high-end logic to prove that this is wrong and Ramanuja simply escapes by telling that “there is nothing which is neither Sat nor asat” when the examples of snake in rope as per Sri Krishna’s definition of Sat and Asat is very clear. The same have been mentioned as the reason against anirvachaneeya khyaathi of Advaita by many dvaita scholars in their books too.

Maybe this lead to “RISHI” (a great scholar) to mention in his hindi commentary on Sarva darshana Sangraha of Maadhava Vidyaranya that Ramanuja and Madhva are considered “Pracchana Tarkikaas” as they use high-end logic when Sruthi herself says that “logic should not be completely taken resort to”. They use high-end logic forgetting the very basic logic of anvaya-vyatireka and relativity-absolute etc.

BNK Sharma in his book “Advaita Siddhi and Nyaayaamrita – a critical up-todate” says that Advaita Siddhi which refutes Nyaayaamritam was refuted in Nyaayamrita tarangini of a dvaitin. Nyaayamrita Tarangini was refuted by the great advaitin Gauda Brahmaananda in his Brahmaanandi or Laghu chandrika. Brahmanandi was refuted by a dvaitin Vanamaala Misra. And BNK Sharma closes by telling that “there the great controversy came to a halt and a standstill” forgetting completely that the refutation of vanamaala misra was counter refuted by Vittalesha Upadhyaaya in his Vittaleshiyaa (not to mention another work by a kerala author which is referred by Kanchi Mahaperiyavaal).

Reality of Brahman can be realized only by a person who is open-minded, accepts all systems are correct from different levels and analyzes those systems without any pre-conceived notions and proper logic (not high-end logic used in Nyaayamritam and others).

Let us all try to get the open-minded by being open to all systems and trying to analyze the systems without any preconceived – thereby realizing the ultimate reality of Brahman as one’s own nature of Consciousness.

It would not be out of context to mention over here that Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswathi of Holenarsipur has shown a particular bhashya text of Sankara in Brahma Sutra Bhashya where Sankara calls the system which considers Brahman as the Nimitta kaarana alone (unlike Advaita which accepts Brahman as the abhinna nimitta upadaana kaarana) as “VEDA BAAHYAH” (outside Vedas). There are two causes which are material and efficient. For the effect of pot, mud is the material cause whereas potter is the efficient cause alone. Madhvacharya’s system of Dvaita considers Brahman as just the efficient cause and not the material cause of the world. Even though this is completely against the second sutra JANMAADI ASYA YATHAH, but still the bhashya which Satchidanandendra Saraswathi is really important in order to show that such systems don’t really have any basis in the Vedas (not Vedanta but even in the Vedas). This need not be considered as something egoistic from the Swamiji, but this is what Sankara has said in his bhashya. It is but out of question that Sankara knowingly accused the Dvaita system because Dvaita system was newly started by Madhvacharya only in the 12th century while Sankara’s time is around the 9th century.

This is important to show that even though many later advaita acharyas like vidyaranya and others knew about this, still they didn’t criticize Dvaita system because Advaita accepts all the other systems at the empirical level. It is but true that only a true Advaitin can bear with anything and everything because he knows that everything except Brahman is only empirically real (and ultimately unreal).

I understand that most of the people would not have even read the entire series but still continuing on the same line, we will try to see Madhvacharya’s Mayavaada Khandanam (along with its commentaries) analyzing it critically from the perspective of Advaita. It is when we analyze the rival system’s arguments against Advaita that the system of Advaita & its concepts becomes clear (BNK Sharma considers the khandana traya which includes Mayavaada khandanam as some of the great works of Madhva which brings out the fallacies in Advaita).

Hope that the series was not intellectual that people in the forum are unable to apprehend it. We will close the series with this mail. If anybody has any doubt regarding the contents of the series, then it can be raised (even though we are closing this topic with this mail) in the forum.

Nityam nirantaraanandam chitghanam brahma nirbhayam
Sruthyaa tarkaanubhootibhyaam aham asmi advayam sadaa

That Brahman which is eternal, ever-blissful, Consciousness in nature and devoid of FEAR -- I am that Brahman always and this is proved through Sruthi, tarka and anubhooti (scriptures, logic and experience).

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 10

2006-05-21T10:55:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM

Humble prostrations to all.

This is the final mail analyzing Shrisha Rao’s mails.

We will continue from where we left in the previous post. We have already discussed in the previous mail that taking resort to the one reason of “Brahman being Nirvishesha as per Advaita” and stating that all theories of Advaita are wrong because of this is not right. Advaita accepts Nirvishesha Brahman as the ultimate reality behind the illusory world, but at the same time accepts savishesha Brahman when it comes to empirical analysis. As Sankara himself says in Brahma Sutra about the two-fold Brahman – Saguna or Savishesha which is associated with names and forms & the nirguna which is devoid of naama and roopa.

We have to remember this fact that advaita does accept savishesha at the empirical level but just says that all the empirical realities or the relativity in the world has an absolute ultimate reality of Nirvishesha Nirguna Brahman behind them as the substratum.

nanu, anyonyAsminnanyonyAtmakatAmanyonyadharmAMshchetyAdinAbhAshhyakR^itA `j~nAnamAnandAvishhayAnubhavo nityatvaM cheti santidharmA' iti paJNchapAdikAkR^itA cha brahmaNi dharmAH svIkR^itA, iti chet.h ? satyam.h na tu paramArthataH,kAlpanikAstubhAvatvAdayodharmAH shUnyavAdinA shUnyasyApiaN^gIkArAt.h yathA.ahuH shUnyavAdinaH, `bhAvArthapratiyogitvaM bhAvatvaM vA na tattvataH nAsya sattvamasattvaM vA na doshho guNa eva vA heyopAdeyarahitaM tachchhUnyaM padamaxayam.h ' -- iti

However, as per the `j~nAnamAnanda' quote from the Panchapadika,it is accepted by us that Brahman has attributes of experiencingjoy, being eternal, etc. (albeit not Real ones) -- thus say you? True. However, these are not ultimately Real, but are apparent only,and such apparent attributes are also accepted by the shUnyavAdins of their shUnya, as the `bhAvArthapratiyogitvaM' quote demonstrates.

nanu dharmAN^gIkArastAvajj~nAyate sa cha paramArthatonetikathaM j~nAyata? -- ityata Aha, `nirvisheshhatva', iti

However, the acceptance of attributes [in respect of Brahman] is known (from the Panchapadika, etc.). How is it known that these attributes are not ultimate?
-- to answer this, it is said, `nirvisheshhatva', thus.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

Here the dvaitin is again repeating the same argument without really understanding that Sat, Chit and Ananda are not the attributes of Brahman but the very nature of Brahman. This nature of Brahman is not an attribute & hence this is not against the Nirvisheshatva (being without attributes) of Brahman. Thus there is no fault whatsoever. Since Brahman can have Sat, Chit and ananda as its svaroopa, therefore the other arguments are invalid as Sat, chit and ananda are not against Nirvisheshatva of Brahman.

The main argument against these qualities or nature of Brahman is that Brahman is Nirvishesha or without attributes & hence Brahman cannot have Sat, chit etc. in it. This main argument itself is proved wrong because Sat, Chit and Ananda are the very nature of Brahman and not attributes – thus these are not at all against the Nirvisheshatva of Brahman.

Also the dvaitin here says that these attributes of Sat, Chit and ananda etc. are not ultimately real. Since shoonyavaada also accepts such things at the empirical level (the vyaavahaarika satya), therefore there is no difference between Advaita and Shoonyavaada as per this point also.

But we have already dealt and concluded that Sat, chit, ananda etc. are the very nature of Brahman and hence they are ultimately real. Thus there is difference between shoonyavada and Advaita. We have to remember here that Sat, chit and ananda are the nature of Brahman but they can be spoken of only at the empirical level but at the paaramarthika level, we cannot even speak about Brahman having Sat because there is only Brahman present at the ultimate or paaramarthika level.

yadi brahmaNo dharmAN^gIkAraH pAramArthikaH syAt.h tadAnirvisheshhatvAN^gIkAravirodhaH syAdityarthaH

If there were to be acceptance of Real attributes in Brahman, then there would be conflict with acceptance of a total lack of attributes, thus is the meaning.

Here the dvaitin says that “if Sat etc. are real attributes in Brahman, then Brahman cannot be nirvishesha” – but we have already answered this by telling that Sat etc. are not the attributes of Brahman but the very nature of Brahman (there is a vast difference between svaroopa and guna as we have already discussed previously).

nanu, `brahma' iti, `shUnyam.h' iti, sa.nj~nAbhedAd.h eva tayorbhedasiddhiriti chenna nimittabhedarahita sa.nj~nA- bhedasya arthavailaxaNyAprayojakatvAt.h tathA hi, brahmashabdasya kiM brahmaNi mukhyavR^ittiramukhyavR^ittirvA ? Adye.api kiM yogarUDhirayogarUDhirvA ? nAdyaH brahmashabdasya yaugikArthohi guNapUrNatvam.h -- `athakasmAduchyate brahmeti, bR^ihanto hi asmin.h guNAH' ityAdi shruteH na cha tvanmate brahmaNastadyuktam.h kuta, ityata Aha -- `nirvisheshhatva' iti

However, because there are two words `Brahman', and `shUnya', this fact alone proves that they must denote different things, so say you? No, that is not right. As given the lack of any cause of difference, the mere variation in usage cannot prove divergence in meaning.

Here the dvaitin is saying that if it is argued that the two words Brahman and Shoonya show difference (as the two different words are used), then it is not correct – because there is no cause of difference between what is intended behind the words.

This is not at all correct. Brahman as per Advaita means that which pervades everything, is great & is seen as the world (Brihattvat brimhanatvaat va Brahma). But shoonya means “void”. The difference between the direct meaning of the word and intended or indirect meaning of the words is also very clear. The direct meaning is very clear – Brahman is that which always exists whereas shoonya is that which never exists or has any existence. The indirect meaning of Brahman is the reality underlying the illusory world when the world is perceived. The indirect meaning of shoonya is the reality underlying the world – this reality which is a void or “non-existent” entity rather than “existent” entity.

A small description on the meaning of words in the scriptures – there are two meanings associated with a word. One is the direct meaning or ruda artha or mukhya artha or vaachya artha. This is the direct meaning of the word – for eg:- ganges means the river ganges (gangaa). The indirect meaning is that meaning which is intended by the word and is used when the direct meaning cannot convey any meaning to the sentence where it is used. For eg:- Gangaayaam ghoshah – the house on the ganges. Indirect meaning is called Lakshya artha (intended meaning). This is used when the direct meaning doesn’t make sense. “The house on the ganges” doesn’t make any sense – hence we have to take the implied meaning of “on the banks of ganges” for the word “Gangaayaam” (the ganges).

Thus there is real difference between the words used too. As per the dvaitins, they take resort to direct meanings of words and even accuse Advaita of taking resort to indirect meaning in many places. The direct meaning of Brahman and shoonya is very clear indeed & there is no need to taking resort to indirect meaning. If difference is to be proved, then indirect or implied meaning (as per the corresponding works of the schools) has to be taken. If indirect meaning is taken, then the accusation against Advaita for usage of indirect meaning in many places will be valid for the dvaitin too. Thus he will be doing things which he himself doesn’t really agree. This will lead to inconsistency in his own system – and it is but obvious then that such inconsistent systems cannot be believed by seekers & hence there will be no real followers of Dvaita system.

The dvaitin further continues the argument about the two words of Brahman and Shoonya in the following paragraph.

Then, too, when you say `Brahman', do you mean its use in the primary sense, or in a secondary sense? Even in the former case, do you mean the `yoga-rUDhi' (scholarly usage), or the `a-yoga-rUDhi'? Not the first. Because the scholarly meaning of `Brahman' is "fullness of attributes," as shown by Shruti such as `atha kasmAduchyate', etc. This meaning is not applicable in your doctrine? Why, for that the answer is given, `nirvisheshhatva', thus.
nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h

Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

The dvaitin gives two options for the sense or meaning of Brahman ---
1. Use in primary sense which again has scholarly usage or empirical usage (empirical usage is associated with normal people who don’t know much of scriptures).
2. Use in secondary sense

In the case of primary, there is scholarly usage which is called YOGA-RUDHI and empirical or normal worldly usage called AYOGA RUDHI. The dvaitin says that the first option of yoga-rudhi is impossible for Brahman because this meaning says that Brahman means “fullness of attributes”. Such a definition is against Advaita because Brahman as per Advaita is Nirguna and Nirvishesha.

But what the meaning of word Brahman given by the Dvaitin is not correct. The dvaitin interprets Brahman as “Brihanthi asmin gunaah ithi Brahma” (that which is full of attributes is called Brahman). But this is not correct – as per the verb Brih, Brahman means that which is great and seen as the world. This definition of greatness is not against Advaita because from empirical viewpoint Brahman is the greatest & nothing can be compared as great as Brahman. The advaitic explanation of “seen as the world” is also valid because of the sutra “Janmaadi asya yatah” (that from which the world has come, that in which the world exists & that into which the world merges, that is Brahman). This is because EFFECT is never different from the CAUSE even as the effect of pot is not different from the cause of mud. Thus the world is not different from Brahman but is just an illusion of names and forms in the substratum of Brahman which seems to be the cause when creation is considered as empirically real. It cannot be stated here that this definition from the Sutra of Brahman as Cause of the world will give the status of reality to the world, because Brahman is never the real cause of the world but just an illusory cause as the substratum of the world. This has been explained in detail in SATYA DARSHANAM of Hariram which can referred for the same. In short, Brahman cannot have any vikaara or modification and there is nothing apart from Brahman too. Thus creation from Brahman is impossible. This is what Gaudapada Karika says “Aaptha kaamasya kaa spriha” (how can there be desire for Brahman who is ever-fulfilled --- this karika is considered as part of Mandukya Sruthi by the Dvaitin). IF the dvaitin here says that the karika itself says that “Icchaa maatram prabhoh sristhih” or “Creation is just a sportive play of the Lord” and Sutra “Lokavattu leela kaivalyam” or the world is just a mere play of the Lord – this is illogical and refuted by the statement “Aaptha kaamasya kaa spriha” because this statement refuting any possibility of creation comes after giving different views of creation and to refute each of those. If again the Dvaitin argues that this aaptha kaama is meant only for the realized saint and not for Ishwara, then it is absurd --- that which is valid for a realized saint should equally be valid for the Ishwara too as ISHWARA is the greatest person and full in all attributes as per the Dvaitin – which would mean that Ishwara can never have any desire as he is perfect & complete. Thus the argument that the world is giving real status is negated & the sutra statement referring to Brahman as the cause of the world is only from the empirical view & giving the THATASTHA LAKSHANA of Brahman as the substratum of the illusory world.

Again, “fullness of attributes” as Brahman is against the various sruthi statements like “Neti, Neti” etc. Also, this would make Brahman limited by those attributes and is against the sruthi statement that “Sadeva Soumya idam agre aaseet ekameva adviteeyam” (Existence alone existed previously, one without a second”. The words “SAD EVA” is very clear. Also, as the Sutra explaining Brahman as the cause of the world shows clearly that prior to creation of the world, there was nothing but Brahman alone. It cannot be said that Brahman with attributes was there prior to creation because attributes are only with respect to the world. For eg: the attribute of SARVAJNA or all-knowing is valid only when the “all” denoting the “world” is there. Thus the dvaitin’s definition of Brahman alone is illogical and against sruthi, smrithi and sutra.

Thus the scholarly meaning of Brahman as per scriptures is not “fullness of attributes” but “that which is great and seen as the world” (the substratum of the illusion of Brahman). Since Rudhi usage put forth by the Dvaitin itself is refuted thus his argument is invalid. And Advaita’s interpretation of Brahman in scholarly usage is without fault and as per scriptures.

The usages possible in respect of Brahman are:
In the primary sense.
In the secondary sense.

For the first case, we can further create the special cases:
As used by scholars.
As used by lay folk.

deshakAlavastuparichchhedarAhityarUpamahatvameva brahmashabda-pravR^ittinimittaM, iti tu mandaM tasya shUnyavAdibhiH shUnye.apyaN^gIkR^itatvena tathAvidhayogavR^ittimato brahmashabdasya tadvailaxaNyAprayojakatvAt.h yathAha shUnyavAdI `jAD.hya saMvR^iti duHkhAntapUrvadoshhavirodhi yad.h' iti

If some dull persons suggest that lack of any restriction on account of space, time, or any other objects, would qualify as greatness which justifies the use of `Brahman', then it is pointed out that this is not useful in indicating difference from the shUnya, for the shUnyavAdI-s also accept that their shUnya is free from such defects, as per their statement `jAD.hya saMvR^iti', etc.

Tatparya Chandrika of Vyaasa Teertha states thus:

Tasmaat deshatah kaalataschaiva gunataschaapi poornathaa
Brahmathaa na tu bhedasya raahityam brahmatha ikshyathe

Therefore “Brahman-hood” means that which is full in space, time and qualities. Brahman-hood is not “being devoid of attributes”.

The above statement is made by assuming that Sruthi and experience prove difference only in the previous sloka of Tatparya Chandrika.

This is but absurd. “Brahman” has to be devoid of qualities as already proved earlier. Also time & space existing, Brahman cannot pervade and be full in them – this is illogical because when it is said that “Brahman pervades space”, that itself means that “space doesn’t really exist”. When “I” say that “I pervade the room”, then there is nothing called room because the room is removed or misplaced by “I”. Also, if time & space do exist, then they will surely limit Brahman (as there should be some relation between them) – the only alternative here is that “time” and “space” are illusory. Taking this particular stand would lead to Advaita itself.

If it be argued that space pervades everything but still is different from everything. This is again a wrong concept only. The Upanishads as well science also says that it is from space that everything came & in space that everything exists. This means that all the objects that we perceive are nothing but space alone but with a name and form. Names and forms are never real – thus we again come back to Advaita only.

On the contrary, Dvaitin will be under trouble here. If Brahman is compared with space & said that Brahman pervades everything in and out – this would mean that Brahman is partless (like space). If Brahman is devoid of parts, it cannot have any guna or attribute. GUNAAS of fatness etc, are based on parts only. This would thus in turn lead to Advaita interpretation of Brahman as Nirguna and Nirvishesha.

The Dvaitin has attacked by saying that shoonyavaadins say that shoonya is devoid of defects & Advaita also says that Brahman is devoid of time, space etc. I don’t know how both of these can be equated. Advaita doesn’t consider time, space etc. as a defect but just says that these have only empirical reality & not eternal reality.

nApi dvitIyaH asiddherapasiddhAntAchcha yathA ghaTAdi-shabdAnAM yathA ghaTatvAdikamevapravR^ittinimittamevaM brahmaNyapi brahmashabdapravR^ittinimittaM kiJNchidvAchyam.h na cha tadyuktam.h kuta ityata Aha -- `nirvisheshhatva', iti

The second case (where `Brahman' is used in the a-yaugika sense)is also not applicable. Because it does not then prove yourdoctrine, and also proves something which is fundamentally opposed to your doctrine. "As the word `pot' is applied to a substance having certain qualities, will you tell us what are the qualities possessed by your Brahman. But, according to you, Brahman has no quality. So Brahman is a mere word with you, and you cannot describe it. In fact, you cannot explain the word which you are using." Why? To answer this, it is said, `nirvisheshhatva', thus.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

Here the Dvaitin takes the empirical usage of a word and asks Advaita as to what does “Brahman” denote? In empirical usage, “pot” etc. denotes an object with qualities or attributes but since Brahman is devoid of attributes, Brahman cannot be explained at all – thus such a Brahman is invalid as per Advaita.

The dvaitin is trying to prove that through any of the possible meanings of words, Brahman is not what Advaita says but Brahman is “full of attributes” alone.

The above logic to prove that Brahman as per Advaita cannot have an empirical usage is wrong. Brahman does have an empirical usage to it as well as “Brahman” even though cannot be described can very well be described. JThe words might be confusing but it is very simple indeed.

Brahman cannot be described as an object – because it is the Subject of all activities. Thus Brahman can very well be described or indicated as the SUBJECT of all activities or SAKSHI of all activities. This is very well logical. When Advaita says that Brahman cannot be described, we only mean that Brahman cannot become an object of any activity. This is because Brahman is the SUBJECT of all activities who can never become an object. And it doesn’t mean that there is nothing called Brahman.

Vidyaranya thus says in Pancha kosha viveka prakaranam of Panchadashi

Svameva anubhootitvaat vidhyathe na anubhaavyatha
Jnaatru jnaanaantharaabhaavaath atreyo na tu asattayaa

Since it exists by itself, therefore it cannot be experienced & not that “it doesn’t exist”. There is no other SUBJECT to experience it, thus it is not experienced and not because of non-existence (which is the characteristic of shoonyam or void).

Thus empirical usage of Brahman as the SUBJECT is valid and logical.

etena tR^itIyo.api nirastaH amukhyavR^ittiritidvitIyapaxe.apikiM brahmashabdasya brahmaNi gauNIvR^ittirlaxaNa vA ? nAdyaH pravR^ittinimittAtiriktamukhyArthaguNayoge hi gauNI dR^ishhTA na cha atra mukhyArthaguNayogo.asti kuta, ityata Aha --`nirvisheshha', iti

By this, even the third option stands refuted (because no difference is seen between `Brahman' and `shUnya' merely on the basis of there being two words). If it be held that the word `Brahman' is used by the mAyAvAdI in a secondary sense, even then, is the word `Brahman' used to denote Brahman by indicating some secondary characteristic (one found in Brahman and also in others, such as "ears" for a cow, which are also found in other animals), or a primary characteristic? Not the first. Because such would only apply if Brahman were to have the characteristic of "Brahman-ness" although that is not its primary characteristic. Then, too, here, no primary characteristic (even other than "Brahman-ness") can be accepted [of Brahman]. Why? For that the answer is, `nirvisheshhatva', thus.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

BRAHMAN and SHOONYA are obviously two different words which have two different meanings from all kinds of usages.

Here the dvatin attacks the meaning of Brahman in a secondary sense trying to show that Brahman and shoonya mean the same thing. The Dvaitin says that “if Brahman is used in secondary sense, how is Brahman indicated? Is it by some primary characteristic or secondary characteristic? It cannot be primary characteristic as Brahman is devoid of qualities. It is also not secondary characteristic as there is no “Brahman-hood” or any other quality which is not specific to Brahman & found in other objects”.

For secondary meaning, there should be some indicating characteristic of Brahman – the dvaitin proves that this characteristic cannot be primary as Brahman doesn’t have any primary qualities. It is not some other secondary characteristic as there is no object which has same quality as Brahman (because Brahman-hood is there only for Brahman and other qualities are there only for the objects different from Brahman).

These objections are also invalid. Even though Brahman doesn’t have primary characteristic but it does have a nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. These are the characteristic which indicate Brahman by telling that “Brahman is that which never ceases, that which never is unconscious and that which never is sorrowful or finite”. Thus this is logical enough to show that Brahman can be indicated in a secondary sense too.

This definition of SAT CHIT ANANDA as Brahman is different from shoonya wherein the reality is ASAT or void. There need not be any more explanation on the same as the meaning and import are very evident.

na dvitIyaH mukhyArthasambandhini arthAntarevR^ittirlaxaNA na cha brahmaNo mukhyArthasambandho.asti kuta, ityata Aha,`nirvisheshha', iti
Not the second case [either]. Because a `laxaNa' has to be a primary characteristic not found elsewhere. But the Brahman cannot have a primary characteristic. Why, for that, we say, `nirvisheshha', thus.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

The above objection has already been mentioned in the previous section.

brahmaNi brahmashabdavachchhUnyavAdinA shUnye.api shUnyashabdasyalaxaNAN^gIkArAchcha yathoktaM shUnyavAdinA, `avAchyaM sarva-shabdaistallaxyate chAkhilaiH padaiH' iti
If it be claimed that Brahman has *apparent* characteristics which would justify the name, then even the shUnyavAdI accepts such *apparent* characteristics of his shUnya as well [thus the existence of two names does not prove different concepts]. As has been stated by the shUnyavAdI-s, `avAchya', etc.

Brahman never has any apparent characteristics but has the nature of SAT, CHIT and ANANDA. That these are the nature of Brahman and not qualities has already been proved. These characteristics are different from that of shoonya. Shoonya is also avaachya not because it is the SUBJECT but because it doesn’t exist. This is very well refuted by vidyaranya in the above quoted sloka as “NA tu asattayaa” (not because Brahman is non-existent but only because it is the SUBJECT which cannot become an object – that Brahman cannot be described as description is making Brahman an object of speech or vaak)

tasmAchchhUnyabrahmaNoravisheshhAnnaparaprameyeshUnyavAdAn. hmAyAvAdasyavailaxaNyam.h aparaprameye vailaxaNyAbhAvaupapAdanatatprAgeva kiJNchitkR^itamiti chaturtho.api nirastaeva, iti
Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any difference betweenshUnyavAda and mAyAvAda, on account of the difference between the shUnya and the Brahman. Therefore, since other possible sources of difference (between sat.h and sadasat.h, mAyA and samvR^iti, and conceptions of moxa) have already been dealt with, it follows that even in this fourth instance, the claim of difference stands refuted, thus.

As has already been proved, there is difference between shoonya and Brahman. Whatever objection the Dvaitin has raised till now has been answered & all those clearly prove that Brahman and Shoonya are clearly different even though various terms seem to be equivalent. It may happen that some things seem same but are never the same – similarly Mayavaada and shoonyavaada are never the same as Advaitic Brahman is something existent & shoonya is something non-existent.

evaM mAyAvAdasya shUnyavAdasAmyamupapAdyopasaMharati
-- "Having thus established the non-difference between the Mayavadins and the Sunyavadins, the Commentator concludes:

-- taH shUnyavAdina eva te.api
"Therefore, it follows that the Mayavadins are the same as Sunyavadins."

Having shown that whatever objections or arguments are made to show that Mayavaaada and shoonyavaada are same are wrong and illogical, it follows that Mayavaadins are not the same as Shoonyavaadins.

Moreover, Mayavaadin take resort to Maya just to answer the illusion of world at the empirical – they believe in Adviteeya Brahman alone & therefore it is appropriate to call Advaita as Brahmavaada from ultimate viewpoint & Mayavaada from empirical view point.

... concluded.

asat.h pade.asansadasadviviktaM mAyAkhyayA samvR^itimabhyadhatta
brahmApyakhaNDaM batashUnyasiddhyai prachchhannabauddho.ayamataH prasiddhaH

The above conclusions only show that Advaita is something beyond normal perception & it requires open-mindedness to apprehend the reality of Brahman as per the scriptures. Unless there is open-mindedness, all sorts of doubts/arguments/objections will be raised. All these are because of “improper understanding” as well as “lack of proper sadhana” to apprehend the reality of Adviteeya Brahman.

Let us all unlike people who just ask questions and raise objections try to follow the SADHANA and apprehend the ultimate reality of Adviteeya Brahman which is very well proved through sruthi, yukthi and anubhava.

With this we come to an end to the analysis of Shrisha Rao’s mail and have answered the objections raised that Advaita system and Shoonyavaada are one and the same. We come to an end to the analysis of Shrisha Rao’s mail.

We will try to analyze how various advaita acharyas from Sankara to Madhusudana Saraswathi attacked the system of Shoonyavaada and clearly show that Advaita and shoonyavaada are not the same in the next mail which will be the final mail in this series.

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavaada and Mayavaada - 9

2006-05-21T10:51:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

Let’s now continue with the mail of Shrisha Rao. Now, the dvaitin attacks the nature or svaroopa of Brahman which is Sat, Chit and Ananda as per Advaita. The main attack is that these are qualities of Brahman and not the nature – these qualities are not present in Brahman as Brahman is nirvishesha and nirguna (without attributes and qualities). Thus Brahman as per Advaita can never be explained as a real entity – thus it is the very same as shoonya of shoonyavadins.

Let’s first once again see the concept of Sat, Chit and Ananda of Brahman and how this is the very nature of Brahman and not just qualities/attributes. Quality or attribute is that which is present in an entity only for a particular period. But the nature is always present and cannot be separated from the entity. Thus Brahman and Sat-Chit-Ananda cannot be separated from one another. As this is the case, therefore Brahman has the nature of Satchitananda and is not the same as shoonya of Dvaitins. IT cannot also be argued that these attributes are not present in Brahman from the paaramarthika level because these are inseparable from Brahman – and are always present. What we have to remember is that from the paaramarthika level, we cannot even speak of Brahman having these as its nature because there is no duality whatsoever in that level. But empirically, we can speak about Brahman as having the very nature of Sat, Chit and Ananda.

Brahman is Sat because it always exists & never ceases to exist. This definition of Sat is as per Gita statement that “Na abhaavah vidhyathe satah” – non-existence is not there for Sat or Reality meaning that the real never ceases to exist. Brahman as one’s own very nature always exists and there is never a moment when non-existence of “I” is experienced. Thus Brahman is of the nature of Sat or always existing.

Sat can always exist only if it is illumined by the light of Chit or consciousness. Consciousness or Chit is that light which illumines entities in the world – it is that light on which all other lights depend. Chit or Consciousness alone can experience its own existence – all other entities get existence because of the illumination of Consciousness. Thus the entities are dependent on Consciousness or Chit for their existence. This means entities or objects are dependent on Consciousness – any dependent entity is temporary only as its very existence depends on the independent entity. This means such an entity will not exist for all the three times. Thus if Sat doesn’t have Chit, then Sat will cease to be Sat (as Sat is that which exists at all times whereas if Chit is not the same as Sat, Sat will exist only for limited time period). This means Sat and Chit go hand in hand – and cannot be separated. Similarly Ananda is bliss. Bliss is that which is unlimited (as per Chandogya statement that Na alpe sukham asthi – yo vai bhoomaa tat sukham). If Ananda is not Sat, then Ananda will be limited and thus will cease to be bliss which is not possible. Thus Ananda and Sat are inseparable. This takes us to the conclusion that Sat, chit and ananda are inseparable and very nature of Brahman and not quality of Brahman like fatness etc.

After having analyzed this, let us now see into the dvaitin’s objections:

"If you say that Brahman of ours is Satyam, Jnanam, etc., to this we say, that these qualities of truth, knowledge, etc., do not exist in Brahman in the highest state. For Mayavadins hold that from a Paramarthika point of view, Brahman is absolutely attributeless."

We have already seen that this objection is not really valid – Brahman doesn’t have sat, chit etc. as its attribute but these are the very nature of Brahman – there is no fault in accepting these as the very nature of Nirvishesha or Nirguna Brahman (because these are not the qualities of Brahman – as explained earlier, there is no mentioning this at the paramarthika level but vyavahaarika level, we can mention these as nature of Brahman).

nanu, paramArthataH satyatvAdyabhAve.api anR^itavirodhitvAdinaivasatyatvAdivyavahAraH yathAhurasmanmatatvavedinaH, `anR^itaMjaDavirodhirUpaM matatrayamalabandhanaduHkhatAviruddham.h',iti tathA choktavidhilaxaNaprayukta eva shUnyAd.h brahmaNo visheshha,iti chenna shUnyavAdibhirapi shUnyasyoktavidhalaxaNAN^gIkArAt.h;yathA.ahuH shUnyavAdinaH, `jAD.hyasaMvR^itiduHkhAntapUrvodoshhavirodhiyad.h' iti uktaM chAnuvyAkhyAne, `anR^itAdivirodhitvaM ubhayoshcha svalaxaNam.h', iti

[The mAyAvAdin retorts:] However, even if there is the lack ofultimate Reality (in the matter of Brahman's attributes), we onlyaccept that Brahman's attributes are "other than false,"(sadasadvilaxaNa, or different from both Real and Unreal) not that they are Real. As has been indicated by our past masters, the Brahman is "different from falsehood, insentience, is complete, and is also exceedingly different from bondage and suffering." Thus,there is a difference between shUnya and Brahman in these respects, so say you? No -- that is not right. Since even the shUnyavAdI-s accept the properties stated by you of their shUnya as well. As say the shUnyavAdI-s, their shUnya is "opposed to all faults of Samvriti enumerated in the list ending with duhkham. So here also, there is no difference in these conceptions." It has also been shown in the anu-vyAkhyAna, "being different from falsehood, etc., is a property common to both," thus.

Here the dvaitin attacks Advaita by first assuming that “Brahman has attributes and that Advaita accepts Sat, Chit and ananda as attributes of Brahman”. This is completely wrong as it has already been proved that Sat, chit and ananda are not the attributes of Brahman but the very nature of Brahman. But as per shoonyavaadins, the reality is shoonya or non-existence. Such a non-existence cannot ever lead to removal of sorrow. And the samvritti accepted by Shoonyavadin surely arises out of voidness (meaning that the samvritti has no basis or substratum at all) whereas Advaita accepts Brahman as the substratum of ajnaana or ignorance and ajnaana is removed by knowledge of Brahman. Thus there is clear difference between both even though samvritti and ajnaana both are accepted as being different from sat and asat (sat means ever-existent & asat means ever non-existent).

nApi viruddhadharmayogAchchhUnyAdbrahmaNo visheshhaH sa chabrahmashUnyayoH kiM bhAvatvAbhAvatvaM vA, sattvAsattvaM vA,doshhitvaguNavattvaM vA, heyatvopAdeyattvaM vA, anyadvA ?sarvatrApi doshhamAha
-- `nirvisheshhatva', iti

"Nor is there any difference between Brahman and Sunyam, in thepossession by one of the attributes contradictory to the other.What are the contradictory attributes which you say [would]distinguish them? Is it that Brahman is existence (bhAva) andSunyam is abhAva or non-existence? Or that Brahman is a substance (sattva) and Sunyam is a non-entity (a-sattva)? Or that Brahman has goodness (guNa) and Sunya has faults (doshha)? Or that Brahman is to be sought (upAdeyaM) and that Sunyam is to be avoided? Or anything else?" All of these are shown to be flawed, `nirvisheshhatva', thus.

The word Shoonya itself says that is something that is non-existent & Brahman is that which ever exists as one’s own very nature. Even though the entire sruthi refutes one’s own existence, one will surely exist because “one’s own existence can never be refuted by any means”. It also doesn’t require any proof for existence of one’s own Consciousness because it is self-established and self-proven. It is only the system of Advaita which can really explain Brahman as ever-existent because in other systems Brahman is considered different from one’s own existence & such a Brahman is temporary and against sruthi statements too.

Thus there is very clear difference between the nature of Brahman and shoonyam. Brahman is a substance or a real entity – this is not against the nirvisheshatva of Brahman as already proved. Since Sat is not against the nirvisheshatva of Brahman, similarly bhaava is also not against nirvisheshatva of Brahman. “Brahman has goodness” is not the statement of Advaita but is a statement imposed on Advaita --- Advaita does accept Brahman as Ananda but clearly says that Brahman is beyond both guna and dosha.

Brahman is that which is to be sought – but we have to remember that this seeking is seeking of the seeker & not external seeking. This seeking the seeker is not at all against nirvisheshatva of Brahman because it is trying to realize the seeker through removal of thoughts in the mind. When the mind contemplates on one thought of Brahman, all other thoughts vanish & finally even this thought vanishes & only Brahman remains behind.

Or as Vidyaranya says in Panchadashi

Katham taadrik mayaa graahyam eti chet prichet maiva graahyam
Sarva grahopasamshaantho svayameva avashishyathe

IF it is asked as to how the indescribable Brahman (which is beyond mind and thoughts) is to be contemplated or sought, it is possible to sought by stopping the activities of all sense organs and inner instruments – then the Self or Brahman remains by itself as non-dual reality.

Thus this “seeking of Brahman” is not against nirvisheshatva provided we append the words “as one’s own very nature”. It is the dvaitin who is getting the concept of advaita wrongly and using this wrong knowledge to attack Advaita. It is interesting to note that the dvaitin just mentioned that “Brahman is to be sought” and attacked Advaita without mentioning or taking into consideration that the Brahman to be sought is one’s own very nature of Self.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

Just holding on to this one reason and refuting all concepts of Advaita is really bad and wrong. As Advaita accepts Savishesha Brahman at the empirical level, all these arguments are futile. IT is only when the paaramarthika level is considered that Advaita accepts Nirvishesha Brahman alone. At the empirical level, savishesha is taken as working empirically and nirvishesha Brahman is the substratum or witness of this savishesha Brahman and its activities too.

We will continue with further analysis in the next post.

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavaada and Mayavaada - 8

2006-05-21T10:35:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

Let’s now analyze the final mail of Shrisha Rao. We will split the last mail of Shrisha Rao into two or three to have a detailed analysis on the same.

... continued from previous part.
Previously, it was claimed that the existence of the Atman of the mAyAvAdIin the form of knowledge is untenable, as nothing that would be called"knowledge" is possible of the Atman.

We have already discussed this and proved that Atman is of the nature of eternal knowledge or Consciousness – that knowledge which knows itself but doesn’t have any distinction of knower and knowledge – it is not a non-existent entity because absence of self-knowing knowledge or self-luminous Consciousness is against sruthi, yukthi and anubhava. Thus this statement of the dvaitin is completely wrong. Also, the dvaitin is criticizing only the “knowledge” aspect of the Atman whereas forgetting that the word CHIT also means Consciousness or BODHAM. If this meaning is taken, then the essence of the moksha stated by Advaita will become pretty clear.

Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha says:
j~nAtR^ij~neyashUnyasyApi j~nAnatvAN^gIkAre ko doshha? iti chet.h,vAchya, vaktR^i, vihInasya vachanasya; bhojya, bhoktR^i, vihInasyabhojanasya; gamya, gantR^i, vihInasya gamanAderapyaN^gIkArApAtAt.h "(In fact, according to the Mayavadins, in the state of Mukti, there is no knower, nor an object of knowledge, but mere knowledge. `But what is the objection to such a belief?'

-- they say. We reply: It is like this, that there is no subject matter of speech, nor a speaker, yet there is speech; or there is no eatable, nor an eater, and yet there is eating; there is no place to go, and there is no goer, yet there is going. All these absurdities will have to be admitted, if it be said that in Mukti there is no knower, nor an object of knowledge, but that there still is knowledge.)"

“There is no knower” doesn’t mean the KNOWER or SUBJECT of Self ceases to exist because sruthi is also against it. When we say there is no knower but Atman of the nature of CHIT or JNAANA or eternal knowledge alone exists is that there is no distinction in the Self at that time. The statement never means that there is no subject at all but only means that the Subject itself is of the nature of knowledge. It cannot be argued that “knowledge” being an action cannot be the same as the knower – because we all experience this very well in dream as well as in examples of “walking”.

Thus Knower or Subject alone exists who is of the nature of Consciousness or KNOWLEDGE in its absolute sense – the absolute sense means that knowledge which exists on its own & is purely knowledge alone – not requiring any other entity for its existence. Thus there is no absurdity in it.

For eg:- in the state of deep sleep, the knower is alone present of the nature of Knowledge – thus we can say that there is KNOWLEDGE alone (as the knowledge of one’s own existence is known after waking up). We say that there is no knower as such there because there is nothing to know over there. Only when objects are there, the subject gets its existence. Thus the Subject of KNOWER exists as KNOWLEDGE without any distinctions. This is not at all absurd but very much logical only.

JI don’t really know from where the Dvaitin got the explanation of Moksha as per Advaita as “Knowledge alone exists without knower”. Advaita says that when the triputi merges into the SAKSHI, that is the state of Moksha or realization wherein only the Self of the nature of CHIT or JNAANA exists – nothing else exists. Here the knower, knowledge and object of knowledge merge into the witness of this triputi.

Any action/transaction requires a witness which should not be involved in the action. Thus for the triputi which consists of Subject, Object and Action – there should be a witness which is not involved at all. This witness is what sruthi calls as Kutastha. Kutastha is the witness Consciousness that is unaffected by the activities it witnesses. The witness-hood itself is only an illusion when the main illusion of actions seem to exist. This witness has to be Conscious in nature else it cannot illumine other entities (the witness has to experience its own existence in order to illumine other existence). Thus the Kutastha Chaitanya is JNAANA or CHIT. JNAANA is not very loosely translated as KNOWLEDGE by acharyas. We will just see one sloka of Panchadashi where Vidyaranya explains JNAANA.

Siddham brahmani satyatvam jnaanatvam tu pureritam
Svayameva anubhootitvaat ithyaadi vachanaih sphutam

If SATYATVA or “Real” nature of Brahman is proved, then JNAANATVAM or Conscious nature has already been proved clearly by the statement “Svayam eva anubhootitvaat” (It experiences itself and doesn’t require any other illumination).

Since Brahman of Advaita is a real entity and not SHOONYA VASTHU, therefore JNAANA means “it experiences its own existence” and not that knowledge of TRIPUTI alone exists.

evaM cha Atmano nityaj~nAnasvarUpamastItyasya vAN^mAtratvenamoxeshUnyavAdimatAnmAyAvAdimatasyanakashchidvisheshha, itisthitam.h

Thus, also (as claimed earlier), as the claim that the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge is an empty utterance, it is concluded that there is no difference between the shUnyavAdI and the mAyAvAdI conceptions of moxa.

The concept of Moksha as per Advaita is pretty clear – the triputi vanishes and only the SAKSHI CHAITANYA exists as “self-existing knowledge or CHIT or JNAANA”. This has already been shown through vidyaranya’s statement. Thus it is wrong to say that “eternal knowledge” or “CHIT” or “JNAANA” is a mere “word” alone without any meaning & that this word is same as “shoonya” of shoonyavaadin.

As per Advaita, Moksha is “Brahma vid brahmaiva bhavathi” – he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.

Again this can also be explained empirically from vidyaranya’s statement itself – Svaroopena sthithir mukthiritheeryathi – “staying in one’s own natural state is called MOKSHA” (Panchadashi 10.4). One’s own nature as per Advaita is “Sat CHIT ANANDA” and hence this Moksha is very much different from “shoonya”.

Thus there is difference between “shoonya” of shoonyavaadins and “Brahman” of Advaita in terms of Moksha.

At this, the opponent may object, saying that there are very significantand important differences between shUnyavAda and mAyAvAda in terms ofmeans and method of sAdhanA for the seeker. This issue is addressed thus:

nApi tatsAdhanavailaxaNyAditi dvitIyaH paxo yuktaH shUnyavAdibhiH shUnyAdvaitatsAxAtkArasyeva mAyAvAdibhirapibrahmAdvaitasAxAtkArasyaiva moxahetutvokteH

"Nor is there any difference between these two schools in their methods of Sadhana. The Sunyavadins say that the realization ofthe Sunya is the method of getting Mukti. The Mayavadins say therealization of Brahma-Advaita is the method of Mukti." Lacking differences in Brahman and shUnya, the methods of sAdhanAtherefore are not distinct.

We have already seen that Brahman and Shoonya are not one and the same but they are distinct. Since the goal is different, therefore “realization of the goal” is also different --- thus the means too are different only.

To once again emphasize, Advaita never really believes in SADHANA because “Moksha is realization of one’s own very nature of Brahman” – there is nothing really to achieve, but just to realize one’s own nature & that everything is Brahman alone (there is only Brahman and no duality at all). This is very important because as per Advaita, the path is not important but the path also is only an illusion itself --- reality alone is REAL and this REALITY has been veiled by ignorance (again an illusion), this ignorance has to be removed to remember/realize one’s own very nature – removal of ignorance is what is the goal of all sadhanas.

Thus “I am already THAT” but just have to realize it (as I seem to have forgot it).

nanu, astu tR^itIyaH paxaH mAyAvAdino hi `brahmaiva tattvam.h' iti bruvate shUnyavAdinastu shUnyameveti tathA cha na dvItIya- paxoktadoshhaH brahmasAxAtkArashUnyasAxAtkArayorvishhaya-vailaxyaNyAdevavailaxaNyasiddheH evaM cha kathaMtayoravisheshha, iti chet.h ? na shUnyavAdyabhimatashUnyAn.hmAyAvAdyabhimatabrahmaNo visheshhoktervyAhatatvAt.h kuta,ityata Aha -- `nirvisheshhatva', iti

"The objector may say, ``There is a third alternative. TheMayavadins say that Brahman alone is the Tattva or the substance,but the Sunyavadins do not believe in any substance. They say itis Sunya or Void, there is no substance. Therefore, there is adifference in the realization of a substance like Brahman, and inthe realization of a non-entity like Void or Sunyam. Thus theobjects sought by these two schools are different. One seeksBrahman, which is a substance; the other seeks Sunyam, which isno substance.'' To this, we reply:-- ``The Sunyam of theSunyavadin has no difference from the Brahman of the Mayavadin.''Why so? Because as the author says:
-- nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h

Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes. "The Mayavadins believe that Brahman has no attributes, and that,therefore, it is as good as a Sunyam or Void.''"

Brahman as per Advaita is nirvishesha or without attributes. This “without attributes” is because Brahman is UNLIMITED or ANANTHA. Anything which has an attribute is limited by the attribute. Let’s say the body has the attribute of “fatness”. This means the body is limited by “fat”. Any limited entity is not Brahman as any limited entity cannot give happiness (as per Sanatkumara’s statement to Narada in Chandogya that Na alpe sukham asthi and Taittiriya Statement of Satyam jnaanam anantham brahma). Thus Brahman cannot be unlimited. If Brahman is unlimited, then it cannot have any attributes.

It cannot be argued that unlimitedness means that “when attributes are present, fullness of the attribute” because such fullness will only lead to absence of the attribute. Let’s say it is said that Brahman is full in terms of space as it is all-pervasive. This means Brahman pervades space and is present everywhere. If Brahman is present everywhere, then from Brahman’s perspective, there is no space at all because space means “limited”. This will lead to “absence of space”. It also cannot be argued that this is only from Brahman’s perspective and not from jeeva’s perspective because since Brahman is considered as independent by Dvaitins, Brahman’s perspective is final. If there is no space as per Brahman’s perspective, then there will be no space as per Jeeva too.

Thus Advaita is well justified in accepting the correct definition of “unlimited” or ANANTHA and thereby concludes to say that Brahman is Nirvishesha. This has support from sruthi also which denies “all characteristics in Brahman” as Neti, Neti --- Avaakmanasagocharam etc.

By this, the commentator shows how a doubt arising from a statement can be resolved by another interpretation of the same statement. As seen below, he does this repeatedly. nanu mAbhUt.h brahmaNo nirvisheshhatvAchchhUnyAdvisheshhaHshUnyasya brahmaNo visheshhaH kiM na syAd.h ? iti mandAshaN^kAMapi apAkaroti -- `nirvisheshhatva', iti Even granting that there is no difference between Brahman and shUnya in terms of lack of attributes, since Brahman has no attributes, yet is it not possible that differences exist in other respects? To remove such a foolish doubt, also, it is said, `nirvisheshha', thus.

Brahman as per Advaita is nirvishesha or without attributes. This “without attributes” is because Brahman is UNLIMITED or ANANTHA. Anything which has an attribute is limited by the attribute. Let’s say the body has the attribute of “fatness”. This means the body is limited by “fat”. Any limited entity is not Brahman as any limited entity cannot give happiness (as per Sanatkumara’s statement to Narada in Chandogya that Na alpe sukham asthi and Taittiriya Statement of Satyam jnaanam anantham brahma). Thus Brahman cannot be unlimited. If Brahman is unlimited, then it cannot have any attributes.

It cannot be argued that unlimitedness means that “when attributes are present, fullness of the attribute” because such fullness will only lead to absence of the attribute. Let’s say it is said that Brahman is full in terms of space as it is all-pervasive. This means Brahman pervades space and is present everywhere. If Brahman is present everywhere, then from Brahman’s perspective, there is no space at all because space means “limited”. This will lead to “absence of space”. It also cannot be argued that this is only from Brahman’s perspective and not from jeeva’s perspective because since Brahman is considered as independent by Dvaitins, Brahman’s perspective is final. If there is no space as per Brahman’s perspective, then there will be no space as per Jeeva too.

Thus Advaita is well justified in accepting the correct definition of “unlimited” or ANANTHA and thereby concludes to say that Brahman is Nirvishesha. This has support from sruthi also which denies “all characteristics in Brahman” as Neti, Neti --- Avaakmanasagocharam etc.

By this, the commentator shows how a doubt arising from a statement can be resolved by another interpretation of the same statement. As seen below, he does this repeatedly. nanu mAbhUt.h brahmaNo nirvisheshhatvAchchhUnyAdvisheshhaHshUnyasya brahmaNo visheshhaH kiM na syAd.h ? iti mandAshaN^kAMapi apAkaroti -- `nirvisheshhatva', iti Even granting that there is no difference between Brahman and shUnya in terms of lack of attributes, since Brahman has no attributes, yet is it not possible that differences exist in other respects? To remove such a foolish doubt, also, it is said, `nirvisheshha', thus.

Brahman as per Advaita, even though is nirvishesha, but still is an existent entity. IT has “SVAROOPA” or nature which is different from attribute. This nature is very well mentioned as SAT CHIT ANANDA ANANTHA in sruthi and puraanas. These are the very nature of Brahman even as burning is the nature of fire – these are not attributes but very nature of Brahman. IT again cannot be argued that “these different terms” mean duality as one term expects the other term and thus these words denote AKHANDA or non-divisible entity of Brahman. A detailed analysis of this can be found in Panchadashi, Sarvajnaatman’s Sanskhepa Sareeraka as well as Advaita Makaranda of Lakshmidhara (in the commentary of Svayam prakaasha yathi, these are made clear where he quotes from sanskhepa sareeraka).

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

shUnyasya shUnyavAdinA.api, iti sheshhaH nirvisheshhaMsvayaM bhAtaM, ityAdi tadvachanAt.h kiM cha yaddhi yatovyAvartate tattdvyAvartakadharmayogenaiva tatovyAvR^ittaM dR^ishhTaM, yathA ghaTapaTaH
"There is no difference between the Sunyavadin and the Mayavadin, for the Sunyavadins also admit that their Sunya has no attributes, like the Brahman of the Mayavadins. For they say their Sunyam is Nirvisesam. Thus Sunyam and Brahman might be different, if there had been any differentiating attributes. A pot is different from a cloth, because of their possessing different attributes.

na cha brahmashUnyayoH kashchidvyAvartakadharmo.asti kuta, ityata Aha, `nirvisheshha', iti nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

kiM cha na tAvadbrahmaNaH shUnyAdvisheshho viruddhalaxhayogAd.h,iti vaktuM yuktam.h "But Brahman and Sunyam cannot be different from each other, because Brahman has no attributes and the Sunyam also has no attributes; since both have no attributes, there can be nothing to distinguish them. Therefore, both are identical."

We have to remember that any entity which is relative is temporary and limited. Any limited entity is only an illusion & not Brahman. Unlimited-ness can come only for absolute entity where there is no duality whatsoever. Brahman also is mentioned as Neha nana asthi kinchana – there is no duality at all --- therefore Brahman alone is absolute. Relative is only an illusion seen in the absolute. Thus absolute is adviteeya Brahman alone.

It cannot be argued for the above statement of Neha nana asthi kinchana that “here duality is negated only in Brahman as Sankara’s bhashya too takes the meaning of IHA as HERE or IN BRAHMAN”, because of the usage of the word “KINCHANA” or WHATSOEVER. Since duality is completely negated in BRAHMAN, this means that all the three bhedhas of svagatha or internal, sajaatheeya or similar entities and vijaatheeya or among different species are negated in Brahman --- thus this also leads to ADVAITA alone.

From the paaramarthika view point, there is nothing other than Brahman to even speak about. Thus everything is only at the empirical viewpoint. From empirical viewpoint, Brahman doesn’t have any attribute but still its nature is SAT, CHIT and ANANDA.

These words are really important and we have to understand them properly in order to avoid confusions and wrong notions. SAT is mentioned to show that Brahman is ever present and not like shoonya. The reality or absolute has to be existent beyond time which is indicated by the word SAT. This is as per Lord’s statement that “Na abhaavah vidhyathe satah” or there is no cessation of existence for SAT. We never experience our own non-existence or absence and hence the reality of Brahman which is our own very nature is SAT or EXISTENT.

Since Brahman is absolute, it has to experience its own existence and that entity which illumines its own existence is called CHIT or Consciousness. CHIT means that Brahman has sphurana or experiences its own existence without any other light.

ANANDA is mentioned to show that Brahman is not sorrowful and limited but unlimited as unlimited entity alone gives SUKHAM (na alpe sukham asthi – yo vai bhooma tat sukham – there is no happiness in limited but that which is unlimited alone is SUKHAM – thus says Sanatkumara to Narada in Chandogya).

These three entities cannot remain without one another. SAT means it is unlimited and existent – SAT can exist only when it experiences its own existence – thus SAT is CHIT also. If SAT is unlimited, it is ANANDA and ANANTHA too. Thus one entity is mentioned or pointed out as SAT CHIT ANANDA. Since these are not the attributes of Brahman but the very nature of Brahman, it doesn’t affect the “nirvisheshatva” of Brahman.

We have to clearly understand that “nirvisheshatva” comes only when there are visheshaas to be negated or denied. Thus this definition is also only temporary from the empirical view point. From the absolute stand point of Brahman, there is no vishesha so that Brahman has to be termed as “nirvishesha”.

sa kIM jagatkAraNatvAdirUpataTasthalaxaNayogo vA satyatvaj~nAnatvAdilaxaNayogo vA ? nAdyaH mAyAvAdibhiH shuddhabrahmaNo jagat.hkAraNatvAdyanaN^gIkArAt.h kuta, ityata Aha -- `nirvisheshhatva', iti aj~nAnopahitasya jagatkAraNatvAN^gIkArastu shUnyavAdo.api samaH; samvR^itiyogena shUnyasyApi shUnyavAdibhirjagatkAraNatva aN^gIkArAt.h yathA.ahuH shUnyavAdinaH, `vishvAkAraM samvR^ittyA yasya tatpadamaxayam.h', iti yathoktamanuvyAkhyAne, `na hi laxaNabhedo.asti nirvisheshhatva tastayoH' iti
"If you say, there is difference in the attributes of Brahman andSunyam, then we ask, where is that difference? If you say Brahman has the attribute of creating, preserving, and destroying the universe, and that Sunyam has no such attribute, to this theauthor replies again in the same words:"

Here the Dvaitin is understanding wrongly or misinterpreting Advaita. Brahman has no attributes as per Advaita but only SVAROOPA. SVAROOPA is different from attributes in that attributes are temporary and remain in an entity only for a particular time period whereas SVAROOPA is that which is ever present and non-removable or indifferent from the entity. Example of svaroopa is “burning power of fire” which is always present in fire. A detailed analysis of this can be had from Satya Darshanam of Hariram.

Advaita says that creating, preserving and destroying is the attribute of Brahman only temporarily. This is only the THATASTHA LAKSHANA of Brahman and not SVAROOPA of Brahman. Thus these are not svaroopa of Nirvishesha Brahman but just temporary definition of Brahman for explaining it or pointing it to the seeker.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h

Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.
"According to you, Mayavadin, Brahman does not create, etc., really. (It is only an imaginary creation. The Suddha Brahman is not the cause of creation, for you say it is Ignorance, supervening on Brahman, which is the cause of creation of the universe. In this respect also there is no difference between the the Sunyavada and the Mayavada. For the Sunyavadins say that it is due to the supervening of Samvriti on Sunyam that there is creation, as in the following line, `vishvAkAraM cha samvR^ityA yasya tat.h padaM axayam.h'."

As per Advaita, there is no “real creation” at all happening. There is not even “imaginary creation” as such a creation also cannot withstand logic. Thus Advaita believes only in “no creation” or AJAATHI VAADA but takes resort to VIVARTHA VAADA wherein the world is said to be apparent transformation of Brahman (even as rope seems to be transformed into snake – no real transformation happens) for explaining it to the initial seeker who will not be able to apprehend the reality that “there is no world at all created”. This in itself is a very big difference from shoonyavaada and advaita.

Also, as per Advaita, the world has an existence for the temporary time period. IT is given a temporary reality status and not said as “completely ideas only” like Shoonyavaada. This is another very big difference as Shoonyavaada says that there is no external world apart from ideas – they deny even temporary reality for the world whereas Advaita gives reality status to the world but a temporary one. Finally, Advaita believes in Ajaathi vaada or “no creation theory” which also is different from the creation concept of Shoonyavaada.

As stated in the anu-vyAkhyAna, "In fact, there are no distinguishing marks between Sunyam and Brahman."

As already proved, there are many-many differences between shoonya and Brahman but it is only lack of open-mindedness of the dvaitin which causes him to outright reject Advaita by claiming that Advaita and shoonya are same only.

If only the dvaitin had shown at least some interest and open-heartedly followed the sadhanas of Advaita before questioning it, he would have easily realized the ultimate reality beyond doubt.

na dvitIyaH mAyAvAdibhirbrahmaNaH paramArthataH satyatvAdianaN^gIkArAt.h kuta, ityata Aha, `nirvisheshha', iti
The second case (where, unlike the shUnya+samvR^iti, Brahman creates a real universe because of His own potency, thus showing a difference from the shUnyavAdI) is also not applicable. Because the mAyAvAdI does not accept the reality of the Brahman's attributes (like the ability to Create, etc.). Why? To this the following answer is given, `nirvisheshha', thus.

nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h
Because [the Brahman] is accepted to be without attributes.

Shoonyavadins say that it is out of shoonya and ideas that world is created but Advaita says that Brahman creates the world out of its potency or the power of Maya. Here the dvaitin attacks by telling that the power of creation or Maya itself is not accepted really in Brahman thus there is no difference between shoonyavadins creation and advaita’s creation. This is wrong because Advaita never really denies the world at the empirical level, it is only at the ultimate level that advaita accepts “no-creation” and “no real Maya” theory. At the empirical level, Advaita does accept Maya but just gives it a temporary status. The world is also given a temporary status. Thus temporary Maya creates temporary world – there is illogicality here and this is equally valid from Advaita viewpoint as both have temporary status only. Since both have temporary status, we can very well eliminate and say that “Maya creates the world”. This is very much different from shoonyavaada where “shoonya creates the world”. Maya as per Advaita is indescribable but is distinct from both real and unreal (Anirvachaneeya) but shoonya is “unreal”. Thus there is difference between both concepts and what the dvaitin argues is wrong.

Even though Brahman is nirvishesha but still it can seem to be savishesha from the empirical view point. This is like a dumb person speaking in dream which is very much logical. Nirvisheshatva is not just removing all attributes but removal or negation of attributes from paaramarthika level. When that world which itself is not there is mentioned, then itself it is empirical level where all attributes are accepted in Brahman (but given a temporary or illusory status). This Brahman which is enjoined or has attributes of creation etc. is called Saguna Brahman or Ishwara whereas Nirguna or Nirvishesha Brahman is just the witness of this activity of “creation” etc. In this way also there is no fault in such a view.

Thus either we can give the Maya or world a “temporary” status or we can consider these attributes of “creation” etc. in Saguna Brahman --- both ways there is no fault in Advaita or Nirvishesha Brahman as it is the SAKSHI or witness in both these cases (the SAKSHITVA is not real but also illusory attribute depending on the illusory objects which it witnesses – this SAKSHI is called KUTASTHA in Advaita to distinguish it from Nirvishesha Brahman which never can become “witness” but seems to be the witness as Kutastha).

Next, the dvaitin attacks Sat, Chit and Ananda of Brahman by putting forth that these are attributes of Brahman – we have already discussed that these are not attributes but the very nature of Brahman. We will see into the dvaitin’s argument and the response to it (in detail if possible as this is a very important concept – we have already dealt this while replying to Koushik’s mail but still will try to repeat or recollect again on the same) in the next mail. We will try to answer the dvaitin’s arguments in the next couple of mails which will take us to the end of Shrisha Rao’s mail – then we will see in one or two mails a comparison of Shoonyavaada and Advaita as well as where do the other schools of Vedanta go wrong in analyzing Advaita).

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 7

2006-05-20T11:57:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

Let’s now try to analyze the 4th mail of Shrisha Rao (we have still one more to go after this). Since there was some work and other worldly things, it took a little long to come up with this 7th part of the series. Instead of analyzing one mail of Shrisha in different mails, we are going to discuss the 7th mail of Shrisha Rao in a single mail itself.

... continued from previous part.
Previously, it was claimed that there is no difference between the shUnya of the shUnyavAdI, and the Atman of the mAyAvAdI, since even the shUnya is a positive entity, a `bhAva-padArtha', according to the shUnyavAdI statement, `tad.h bhAvaM yoginaM nayet.h'. Thus, claiming that the shUnya is a "void" -- an absence or an `abhAva-padArtha', does not hold good, and does not show difference from the Atman, which is also a bhAva-padArtha.

We cannot really take the word of the Dvaitin over here – we have to go back and try to find out what Nagarjuna and others speak about the reality. And currently, since Sureshwara, Sri Harsha, Chitsukha, Vidyaranya and all criticize the shoonyavaada school for not asserting the bhaava padaartha of Brahman or Existence, we can take surely it for granted that by shoonya is meant a non-existent entity. Again abhaava is with respect to a bhaava padaartha, but here we have just non-existence (it is not with respect to any thing – for example avidya can be said to be abhaava of vidhya – but here it is not the case).

Also we have already discussed that Nagarjuna was well-versed in sanskrit and such a person will never use a word such as “shoonya” which can cause misconception and confusion but if the reality as per him was an existent entity, then the last word which he would put to explain the reality is SHOONYA (last word in the sense, if no other word is got by him for the same).

Thus there is difference between Atman which is SAD and Shoonya which is NON-EXISTENT.

There is not also a difference in qualities, for by the mere assertion that the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge in moksha, there is not the least difference shown between shUnyavAda and mAyAvAda:

na cha nityaj~nAnasvarUpamastItivachanena kashchidvisheshhaH

The reason for this is that such "knowledge" cannot really exist, given the lack of a subject for that knowledge:
j~neyAbhAve j~nAnasyApyabhAvAt.h

We have already discussed that Self or Atman is Self-luminous and in which the differentiation between knower and knowledge vanishes. But this in no way proves that the Self cannot be of the nature of Knowledge. Also the Self is of the nature of Consciousness which is equivalent to knowledge. And Consciousness exists even when there are no objects to illumine. And this we have already proved and the state of deep sleep clearly proves. Also a person always “knows” himself – this means he has knowledge about himself. This means he is both the knower as well as the knowledge – but still there is no object of knowledge. We cannot accept here that the Self is the object also as he is known because here there is no differentiation between “knower” and “knowledge” so as for the Self to become an object of knowledge. That the Self is both knower and knowledge is just mentioned to answer criticisms that it is a non-existent entity and that knowledge can exist without any object of knowledge. Thus “knowledge” can really exist without a separate “knower” because the Self which is of the nature of knowledge doesn’t require any other knower than itself to “know about its own existence”.

To conclude the Self is of the nature of knowledge and doesn’t require any other Subject than itself for existing. Thus the objection is invalid.

However, why not accept that while in the world there may not be such knowledge-without-subject, in the condition of moksha such is possible? Because there is not the least proof that anything by name of "knowledge" itself exists anywhere without a subject for it:

na hi j~neyarahitaM j~nAnaM nAma asti iti kiJNchinmAnam.h
At this, it is possible for the objector to say: in the non-dual state, there is not *another* subject of knowledge, but this does not exclude the Atman itself as its own subject of knowledge. Thus, the above flaws do not apply –

Whatever we have discussed above is being put forth as an objection – but here only the state of moksha is accepted and not normal state. In the normal state itself this is valid that the Self is of the nature of knowledge and still knower also (without any object of knowledge).

To this, our author responds:
na cha svavishhayaM taditi teshhAM paxaH ? tadA kartR^ikarmavirodhaApatIti hi teshhAM vachanam.h ? na cha jAnAtItyAdikartR^itvaM j~nAnasya tairaN^gIkriyate ? nirvisheshhatvAN^gIkArAt.h

[However] it is not accepted by them that that [knowledge] is with itself (i.e., the Atman) for its subject? For then, "confounding of actor and action would result," thus indeed is their statement? And they also do not accept that actions such as "knowing" are possible in respect of the knowledge [of the Atman]? Because it is accepted [by them] that the Atman is without attributes.

Mainly two things are being criticized here:

1. The Self even though being “knowledge” in nature has itself as the subject meaning that Atman or Self is both knowledge and knower. As it is both knowledge and knower, there is actor and action present which is a clear indication of duality.
2. Actions such as “knowing” is not possible for the Self because it is nirvishesha or without any attributes

As we already discussed earlier, the Self is the knower of itself as knowledge. This is contradictory because the Self then becomes an object. And since it is an object of knowledge, it has some qualities based on which it is known. Thus the Self becomes saguna (with qualities) and savishesha (with attributes) which is not accepted by Advaita. --- This is what the second argument of the Dvaitin is.

The first argument is:
Since the Self is both knowledge and knower, there is an actor which is knower here & action which is “knowledge” or knowing. Any action has duality in it – since there is duality present, thus the Self is not non-dual as the Advaitin states. Thus Advaita fails.
The above two points are being explained in detailed in the below paragraph (of Shrisha Rao) which I think would be too much to discuss and some points too subtle and highly logical – hence we will not enter into the discussion of the below paragraph but try to answer the two points mentioned above.

Answers

1.When we say that the Self is the knower of its own very nature of knowledge, we only mean that “it doesn’t require any other knower as such” – it is only meant to show that the Self is self-luminous and doesn’t require any other illumination but exists of its own. And as we all experience this very clearly that “I know myself”, therefore action and actor in a single entity is very much possible and not illogical. Since it is possible in a single entity itself, there is no duality also. And also since this “knowing oneself” is intuitive and we cannot clearly demark it as “knowledge” and “knower”, therefore there are no inner parts also for the Self. The Self being the knower and knowledge is only a kind of explaining the reality that Self is self-existing and exists of its own without being non-existent like the horns of a hare.

2.As explained above, there is no “knowing” in its normal usage of the self – it is only an intuitive experience which says that “I-exist as I know am there” – this experience is not similar to the knowing of objects in the world. This is what we call as Aparoksha anubhava or intuitive and direct experience. Since this knowing exists by itself and doesn’t require any karana or instruments as such, there is no fault of the object of Self being with attributes. Only in the case of external knowing of objects, does attributes come into picture. Since Self is of the nature of knowledge and knows itself (intuitively and this differentiation of knowing itself cannot really be split from the knowledge nature of the Self), it is self-luminous and knows “itself” – there is no fault in such a statement which is only a statement from the empirical viewpoint. From the ultimate viewpoint, there is nothing even to speak about. We have to remember here that Self is not “known” in its generic sense as external objects but as self-luminous and intuitive experience of oneself. Only in cases of perception of external objects, attributes has to be accepted – when this knowing is directed towards the knower, there is no attribute present but only the merging or destruction of the difference of knowing and knower or Jnaana and Jnaatra (Jnaatha). Thus, even though “knowing” in its generic meaning of external objects is not possible for the Self but knowing it as one’s own very nature (through intuition or direct experience) is very much possible even though it has no attributes.

Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha explains the above as follows: dvitIyaM dUshhayati -- `na cha' iti yadyapi asmanmate AtmarUpaM j~nAnaM svavishhayakaM AtmanaH svaprakAshatvAN^gIkArAt.h tathA.api teshhAM mAyAvAdinAM paxo na bhavati nachaivaMAtmanastanmate svaprakAshatvAN^gIkAravirodhaH aparaprakAshyatvaMsvaprakAshatvamiti parasiddhAntAditi bhAvaH AtmasvarUpaMj~nAnaM svavishhayaM iti teshhAM paxo na bhavati, iti kuto j~nAyata? ityata Aha -- `tad.h' iti yadi AtmasvarUpabhUtaM j~nAnaM svavishhayaM syAt.h, tadaj~nAnasyaiva kartR^itvaM karmatvaM cha aN^gIkartavyaM syAt.h ? vishhayIkaraNalaxaNavyApAraM pratij~nAnasya kartR^itvAt.h, anyathAj~nAnaM svAtmAnaM vishhayIkarotIti na syAt.h ? na chaikasyAM kriyAyAM ekasyaivakartR^itvaM karmatvaM cha yuktaM, virodhAt.h parasamavetakriyAjanyaphalashAlitvasya karmalaxaNatvAditi bhAvaH evamAtmasvarUpasya vishhayashUnyatvena j~nAnatvAbhAvamupapAdyedAnIM j~nAtrabhAvAdapitannaj~nAnamityAha, `na cha', iti AtmasvarUpabhUtaj~nAnaM prati natAvadanyaH kartA asti, tadabhAvAt.h ata AtmasvarUpaj~nAnamevasvaMpratikartriti vaktavyam.h tatredaM dUshhaNam.h Adipadena anubhavatItyAder- grahaNam.h j~nAnasyAtmasvarUpasya kuta etajj~nAyata iti chet.h ? j~nAnarUpakriyAM prati AtmarUpaj~nAnasya kartR^itvAN^gIkAre AtmarUpaj~nAnaM svAshraya ityuktaM syAt.h ? dhAtvarthAshrayasyaiva kartR^itvAt.h na cha tadyujyata, ityAha

-- `nirvisheshhatva' iti The second case (see last part for the first) is refuted, `na cha', thus. Although in our doctrine, it is accepted that theknowledge is the form of the Atman, which has itself as its subject, and illumines the Atman, this is not so in their, Mayavadins, doctrine. This is also not opposed to the acceptance in their doctrine of the self-luminosity of the Atman. For it is held by them that others are illuminated, and the Self is the luminous, thus.

However, how is it known that the knowledge of the self-same-nature of the Atman is not with itself as its subject?

-- to answer this, it is stated, `tad.h', thus. If the knowledge which is the nature of the Atman were to have itself for its subject, then would it not be that ignorance alone is created, and is the product of work? Since knowledge (which is the same as the Atman) would then have the role of actor, would it also not follow that it performs the action of experiencing itself? It is not proper for there to be, in the same action, the role of actor, and action-ness, all in one, because this is opposed to the notion of action. As it is understood that action refers to that which is caused on account of different entities coalescing to produce results. Then, too, having stated that there can be no knowledge in the absence of a subject for the same, there also cannot be knowledge, for lack of a knower -- to show this it is said, `na cha', thus: in case of the knowledge of the nature of Atman, there is no other actor possible, there being the lack of the same (in the non-dual state). Thus, in case of the knowledge of the nature of Atman, that itself is the actor, so must be stated. For such a claim, this is the refutation: by the word `Adi', "experiences," etc., are shown. How is this known in respect of the knowledge which is the nature of the Atman, so sayyou? It would follow, if the agency of the Atman over the actionwhich is knowledge, is acknowledged, then the would the Atman notbe considered specialized? (For having the agency over the action of the knowledge of itself.) This also cannot be accepted, to show this, it is stated, `nirvisheshhatva', thus (that no attributes or qualities whatever are accepted of the Atman by mAyAvAdI-s).
Therefore, it follows, as a consequence, that the Atman cannot even have itself as the subject of its knowledge, and cannot have anything that would be meaningfully described as "knowledge," period. Thus, there is no difference shown from the shUnya by the mere statement that the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge in moxa: it is only an empty statement, such as could be made of an inert object such as a pot as well.

The above things have been considered in general and convincingly answered – since the above paragraphs are too much logical in nature, we will not enter into it as such except for the general discussion of the two points which has been mentioned above and answered.

The idea that ignorance is a product of work conflicts with the claim thatit is anAdi -- uncreated and existing since beginningless time. If, tododge this problem, the opponent claims that neither ignorance norknowledge are created, but are innate, then that position would beunsupported by evidence, would also involve simultaneous acceptance oflogical opposites, and would also give scope to the vexed question of howsuch a state of affairs could possibly be changed for the better. Forthese reasons it is not explicitly refuted by the illustrious commentator.

Ignorance is never a product of work but ignorance is very much increased by work. This we know very well because work is caused out of desire and desire out of ignorance of one’s own perfection. The more work is done, the more desire is created in the mind which means more and more ignorance is caused. Thus ignorance is increased through work.

The objection raised here by the opponent is that if work produces ignorance, then it will be against the theory of Advaita that Avidya or ignorance is anaadi (Chitsukha says in Chitsukhi that Anaadi bhaava roopam yad vijnaanena vileeyathe about Avidya – Avidya is without beginning, distinct from non-existent or not abhaava and it is sublated by knowledge).

But there is no fault at all in our view because we don’t say that by work, ignorance is produced but only that through work, ignorance is increased. An increase in any entity is never production of the entity as a new one. Also this explanation of ignorance increasing is only at the empirical level for the ignorant seeker who really seeks answer, because avidya is anirvachaneeya or cannot really be predicted as it is only an illusion. We can just guess that it will increase because the more a person does work, the more he losses happiness by creation of more desires – this means his ignorance is increasing – the intent of ignorance or degree of ignorance is being increased.

Thus there is no real substance in the objection as we never say avidya is caused by work but only that avidya is increased by work (there might be some objections to this also which we will see in the next mail on this series).

... to be continued.

Prostrations to all.
HARI AUM

Thanks,
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 6

2006-05-20T11:17:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

... continued from previous part.
Previously, it was claimed that there is not the least distinction betweenthe shUnyavAdI and the mAyAvAdI conceptions of moxa:

na cha shUnyavAdinAM tadvAdinAM cha kashchid.h visheshho moxe
The reason for this was stated to be that the conceptions of moksha in shUnyavAda and in mAyAvAda are identical; in the former, it is conceived of as removal of `samvR^iti', and in the latter, as removal of `avidyA'. With `samvR^iti' and `avidyA' being terms having the same meaning, no distinction can be claimed in this fashion. Merely stating that the Brahmah is in the form of eternal knowledge, while no such is claimed ofthe shUnya, is not a distinction either.

As explained previously, Moksha in Advaita is removal of avidya which never really exists but it is not that way in shoonyavaada as we have already discussed. What is said above is also wrong that Brahman and Shoonya don’t have distinctions: we have already seen that both are different only. One is an existent entity whereas the other is non-existent entity – this is a huge difference and cannot be really ignored. Advaita never really believes in “removal of ignorance” but only “sublation of ignorance” because “ignorance” itself is a non-existent entity.

The Self is self-luminous and of the nature of Consciousness, therefore ignorance cannot really veil it. Even this veiling is only an illusion which again requires a witness to the veiling which is the ultimate reality of Self.

Sureshwaracharya clearly in Manasollasa and other places tells that “ignorance” cannot be destroyed because it doesn’t even exist. IT can only be sublated – the word used is “Badhya”. It is sublated by knowledge about oneself. When this knowledge which is also a quality of the mind is created, it destroys ignorance. Both cancel out and there is the ever-present Self as the witness & unaffected by all activities.

This theory about illusory ignorance which seems to veil the Self & doesn’t really bind the Self has proof from the scriptures itself. “Dhyaayateeva lelaayathee iva” – seems to be contemplating, seems to be enjoying etc. from Brihadaranyaka – so also “Asango hi ayam purushah” – this Self is unattached (meaning unattached to everything whether it be ignorance or any other thing).
Thus it is pretty clear that the concept of Moksha itself is different between Advaita and Shoonyavada. Shoonyavada can claim “samvritti” but this “samvritti” itself cannot hold any proof as this itself has arisen or caused out of VOIDNESS (according to shoonyavada, everything has come out of shoonya). Since it has come out of shoonya, it cannot have any proof (as proof is possible only for an existent entity). Therefore “samvritti” itself is not proved – this means destruction of samvritti also cannot be proved – which means moksha itself cannot be provedJ.

But in the case of Advaita, Moksha is very well proved through sruthi itself (yukthi can of course also prove this).

Thus Sureshwaracharya says in Manasollasa
Shoonyam chet jagatho hetuh – jagatah na siddhyathi
Ghatah shoonyah patah shoonyah kaih prathipaadhyathe

If void is said to the cause of the world – world itself is without any proof or non-existent. In such a case, “pot is void “ , “cloth is void” etc. is proved or known through whom and by whom??? (As there is no existent entity at all).

Thus there is clear distinction between moksha of both schools – also Brahman is of the nature of Consciousness or knowledge which is ever-existent. The so-called refuter or Shrisha Rao or Raghuttama Tiirtha has to be existent to prove anything – this existence is due to the reality of Consciousness – if Vishnu is without Consciousness, then there is no difference between him and a rock!!!!!

The last statement that “Merely stating that theBrahmah is in the form of eternal knowledge, while no such is claimed ofthe shUnya, is not a distinction either.

” itself brings out the narrow-mindedness of the person and not wanting to attack through logic and the logic will fail and support Advaita alone. This point is brought out with more objections in the below paragraph which we will see now.

However, this can be objected to, as Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha says:

nanu asminmate brahmaNaH paramAnandAtmakatayAtadbhAvaH purushhArthaH duHkhanivR^ittivyatirekeNa niratishaya AnandasphuraNAt.h yathoktaM, `tasmAd.h avidyAstamayo- nityAnandapratItitaH niHsheshhaduHkhachchhedAchcha purushhArthaH paro matam.h' iti naiva shUnyamiti natad.h bhAvaH purushhArthaH -- iti chet.h ? AnandamanubhUyAsaM itivad.h AnandadobhUyAsamitIchchhAyA adarshanena Anandatvasya apurushhArthatvAt.h svavR^ittyAnandAnubhavaH purushhArtho.api pareNa neshhyatve sukhasyasvavR^ittitvAnabhyupagamAt.h svasminkartR^ikarmabhAvAnabhyupagamAchcha kiJNcha brahmaNaH sukhamAtratveprakAshamAtratve vA sukhaprakAshAbhAvena apurushhArthatvam.h ubhayAtmakatve cha akhaNDatvahAniH

Translation (as stated before, when in quotes, is due to S.C. Vasu; his translations are somewhat inexact, but are generally reasonable synopses):

"The Advaitins say :-- `According to our doctrine, Brahman, being of the nature of supreme bliss, our goal is to get to this Brahman, or to get this supreme bliss. The Sunyavadins merely want to go to Sunya or void. Their Sunya is not bliss. So there is a difference between us and Sunyavadins.' To this, we reply:--Here also there is no difference. You Mayavadins want to become Brahman or to become bliss. You do not say, `We want to experience_bliss.' You say, `We want to _become_ bliss. When one becomes bliss, according to you, one has no consciousness of bliss. One does not enjoy bliss. For you do not believe that there is any consciousness of any enjoyment in that condition. For you say that the Self cannot become the object of Self-consciousness.
According to you, Brahman is merely bliss and light. This cannot be the highest end. It is a state of inertness. It is thus like saying, `I do not want to taste sugar, or its sweetness,but I wish to become sugar.' What is the good of one's becoming sugar, if one has no consciousness of its sweetness. The want of consciousness cannot be the highest end of man; in fact, there is no difference in this unconscious Brahma-Bhava of the Mayavadin, and the Sunyabhava of the Madhyamikas."

First of all, the statement is clearly interpreting Advaita wrongly – Advaita never says the goal is to get Supreme Bliss. How idiotic and foolish the interpretator is here (pardon the critical usage): because when Advaita clearly says that there is no goal as such to attain (as Sankara again and again asserts in his bhashyas), still to say that “goal is to get Supreme Bliss” is clearly due to misinterpretation (knowingly) as the person who is objecting is well versed with Sanskrit as well as with Acharya’s bhashyas where he clearly mentions this.

Since the very first statement of Advaitin is wrong, hence we really need not go into the other objections. But from empirical viewpoint, let us assume that Advaita says that realization is “get supreme bliss” and continue (which will also prove Advaita to be correct and objections to be invalid).

As the objector says when Advaitin says that “we want to become bliss”, one becomes bliss and not enjoys bliss. This statement is completely wrong. When we say that “a person becomes bliss”, it means that he becomes blissful so that nothing else is desired. Bliss is perfect or full only when there is completeness in it & nothing is desired. When there is desire, there is incompleteness. When bliss is enjoyed objectively, there are limitations and hence it is not perfect. But when one becomes bliss, there is no limitation and hence there is completeness and perfectness.

In this case, what the objector says that “one does not enjoy bliss for there is no consciousness of any enjoyment in that condition” is also wrong. When a person becomes bliss, he enjoys it completely as Sankara has said “nandhathi nandhathi nandhathi eva”, “paraam shanthi achirena adhigacchathi” (Gita) etc. clearly mention it. But what we mean here by saying that there is no enjoyment is that there is no enjoyment of objects – it is subjective enjoyment which cannot be expressed because there is no separate object as such to enjoy. Similarly there is surely consciousness of enjoyment in that state because one’s own nature is Consciousness only. But there is no objective Consciousness there. Thus what the objector has got here is wrong understanding of Advaita. There is Consciousness of enjoyment because one is Conscious always & this enjoyment is one with Consciousness but not objective as we experience currently.

Thus when we say that “there is no enjoyment of bliss”, we mean to say that there is no objective enjoyment. What is enjoyment? Enjoyment means there is the a enjoyer and an object of enjoyment – when these both merge, there is perfect harmony and one alone – in this state, there is enjoyment but it is subjective and hence not objective as such.
“Self cannot become the object of Self-Consciousness” – what has this statement to do with in this context. Yes, if bliss is different from the Self – this is valid. But if bliss is one with the Self, this statement if not valid. And as such we have already discussed about “enjoyment of bliss” as such the subject becomes “bliss” and therefore no objective enjoyment but there is enjoyment which is beyond words as it is subjective. This bliss is often compared to the bliss in deep sleep – in deep sleep, how did one enjoy bliss???? This question cannot be answered because it was subjective enjoyment and not objective. As to deep sleep bliss is given by the Lord, we have already discussed and refuted such a theory.

According to you, Brahman is merely bliss and light. This cannot be the highest end. It is a state of inertness.

This is utter foolishness and wrong translation of what Advaita says. Brahman is Vijnaana ananda or Chit and ananda. Chit is light but it is not an objective light like tube etc. which require other lights for its existence – but it is self-luminous. Thus translating Brahman as “light” is wrong and the right translation would be “consciousness” which has the meaning of light but something more too.

Since Brahman is Consciousness – it can and is the highest end. It is never a state of inertness because wherever there is Consciousness, there cannot be inertness. Inert is that which is not conscious of its own existence. If Brahman is interpreted as “mere light”, then this fault and objection is valid. But since we say Brahman is “light of all lights” which is Consciousness, therefore this objection is completely invalid and wrongly put forth.
In the above objection, we find how the Dvaitin twists the meanings and definitions of Advaita itself and after giving wrong interpretation, attacks the wrong interpretation with logic. Advaita never says Brahman is “Light” but only says Brahman is “Consciousness”. So giving the wrong interpretation of “light”, the objection is raised about “inertness” Is there anything more illogical or wrong than this?????

Consciousness is that light which is self-existent and self-luminous. Since it experiences its own existence, there cannot be any inertness in Consciousness. Inert and conscious are like darkness and light – both can never remain together. It cannot also be claimed that experience proves Consciousness to be inert because we never experience ourselves as an inert object like a rock.

Inertness is not able to experience one’s own existence but gaining existence from other objects.
Consciousness is being able to experience one’s own existence and thereby giving existence to other objects too (insentient objects).

This is very well experienced by all – “I” is present always and experiences that “I-exist, I-exist”. Moreover it is because of this “I” that we experience the existence of other objects too. A rock has existence only when a conscious being perceives it. Else like in deep sleep, there is no existence of the rock.

Thus the highest end of Advaita is not a state of inertness but it is a state of unlimited Consciousness (Consciousness is never limited by seems to be limited & from this empirical view, it is said as “unlimited” and not really “unlimited” because it is both beyond limited and unlimited).

It is thus like saying, `I do not want to taste sugar, or its sweetness, but I wish to become sugar.' What is the good of one's becoming sugar, if one has no consciousness of its sweetness. The want of consciousness cannot be the highest end of man; in fact, there is no difference in this unconscious Brahma-Bhava of the Mayavadin,and the Sunyabhava of the Madhyamikas."

We have already proved that Brahman is no unconscious and thus the last statement is proved wrong. Thus there is difference between shoonyavdaa which says the final goal is “void” which is unconscious and Advaita which accepts the Conscious entity of Brahman.

As long as there is difference in the form of Subject and Object, there will be limitedness and more seeking out will be there. The questioner forgets that “is he really happy with tasting sugar or its sweetness”?? No, never because an object cannot satisfy the desire of a person. This is why Krishna says in Gita

“Ye hi samsparshajaa bhogaah dukhayonaya eva te
Adhyantha vantha kaunteya na teshu ramathe budhah”

Those enjoyments which is attained through contact with sense objects is full of sorrow only (gives birth to sorrow). Those have a beginning and an end, therefore the wise never relies on them (or rests his mind on them).

The above statement of Krishna is enough to show that objects cannot give eternal bliss even if it is Lord Vishnu as to know Vishnu, you need to perceive Vishnu with either of the external sense organs or the inner equipments. And since it is an object perceived (either through senses or supra sensual experience or mystic experiences through HIS grace), it is full of sorrow alone.

Thus there is no use of enjoying sugar as such but what is required is to remove the limitedness due to the sugar – remove the gap in between sugar and the person. This means when a person becomes sugar, he is full of sweetness. Is full of sweetness (which is always present) or getting sweetness at some points of time alone great or better????? Any wise person will opt for the first one only wherein the seeker merges into sweetness.

And as we have already proved that when a conscious being becomes sugar, still the Consciousness remains (it is not an unconscious experience of the sweetness) as in deep sleep we get more happiness than in waking state (in deep sleep, there is merging into the object whereas in waking, we don’t merge but the differentiation of object and subject still persists). Thus it is pretty clear that even when differentiation vanishes (as in deep sleep); Consciousness still is there (as it is said “I slept well” by the person when he wakes up). So the highest goal of Advaita is not unconscious void or shoonya but it is a chaitanya vasthu.

It is utter foolish to say that “the Brahman of Advaita is unconscious” – it is entirely out of ignorance only. We have already discussed in the starting of this series that when there are no objects, still consciousness persists & that definition or assumption of the Dvaitin that “when there are no other objects to perceive, there is no Consciousness at all” is completely wrong – this has already been proved and hence we will not enter into it again. Those who have forgotten about the same can refer back for the same.

The Advaitins again object to this characterization of their concept of moxa; as Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha says: nanu shUnyavAdibhirAtmanAsho moxa ityuchyate na tathA asmAbhiraN^gIkriyate moxe, Atmano nityaj~nAnasvarUpamasti ityaN^gIkArAt.h ataH kathaM na visheshha ityata Aha, `na cha, iti'. "The Mayavadin says :-- `The Sunyavadin believes that the destruction of Atman is Moksa. But we do not say so. We believe that in Moksa the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge. Why do you then say that there is no difference between the Mayavadin and the Sunyavadin?' To this, the author replies :--"

First of all, I really don’t believe that this is a genuine statement of an Advaitin. The purvapaksha seems to be just cocked up so that it can be attacked. The statement that “in Moksha the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge” is not exactly correct because even when seemingly in bondage also, the Atman is in the form of eternal knowledge only. If the Dvaitin says that Advaita says so, then it is wrong because Sankara uses the words “Nitya Shuddha Budhdha Muktha” for the Atman in the chatusutri brahma sutra bhashya which clearly mean that whether “in moksha” or “in bandha”, the Atman is the same. Thus there is no difference of the Atman in state of bondage and moksha – bondage and moksha are only in the mind.

Upanishad says
Man eva manushyaanaam kaaranam bandha mokshayoh
Bandhaaya vishayaasaktam muktaih nirvishayam smritam

Mind alone is the cause of bondage and liberation. When the mind is extroverted and seeking sensual pleasures, it is in bondage. When it is diverted towards its source of the Self, then it merges into the Self and this is liberation.

Sankara in his commentary on Gita 13.2 “the Self in all bodies are me alone” clearly mentions that the Self or Atman or Kutastha is never in bondage but just seems to be in bondage. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad statement which he frequently uses in his commentaries (for eg: in Ishavasya Upanishad) is “Dhyaayateeva lelaayathi iva” – Dhyayathi iva means like concentrating, like enjoying. Thus there is no real bondage accepted for the Self even as the dreamer is never affected by the dream activities but seems to be affected.

When this is the case, there is no difference in Atman in states of bondage and liberation --- bondage means the Self seems to be affected but is not really affected – liberation means even that “seemingly affected” is not there. It really doesn’t matter whether “seemingly affected” is there or not because it in no way can affect its own substratum or witness of the Self or Atman even as it doesn’t really matter what is the type of snake seen in the rope as there is no snake & rope is not at all affected by the snake and its types etc.

Thus the purvapaksha statement itself is wrong – thus there is no need to refute whatever objection will follow based on this purvapaksha (because the objections base itself on the assumption that purvapaksha is right as per the purvapaksha system or Advaita which is no the case here). JBut still Advaita has answers to any questions in the world – let’s still try to analyze the objections and answer them in a convincing way (even though this is not required in this case, but still since Advaita knowledge will become more clear we will analyze it).

By this, the worthy commentator illustrates an instance where a question arising out of a statement of Srimad Ananda Tiirtha is answered by another application of that very statement:
na cha nityaj~nAnasvarUpamastIti vachanena kashchidvisheshhaH
"There is no difference between the Sunyavadin and the Mayavadin, by the mere assertion of the one that the Atman exists in Moksa in the form of eternal knowledge. (It is merely a verbal distinction.)"

Poor Dvaitin, he is under the notion that the statement is what Advaita accepts – but we have already analyzed this.

But let’s say he says that “we are not comparing whether Atman is there continuously or not but we are analyzing whether Atman is there after moksha – in that case, both shoonya and Nirvishesha Brahman is the same” – but this is also not correct because we have already proved again and again that when the distinctions of knower, known and knowing vanish, still the Consciousness remains as the mere witness of the activity. WE have proved that in that state, there will be the Consciousness still existing as non-dual Self. And such a state is what Advaita says as Moksha when a person realizes his own very nature of Self without any distinctions – even during distinctions he is the Self but seems to be deluded by them and attached/affected by them when he is not really affected as he is the witness or Sakshi (which cannot change at all).

Thus the Atman as an existent entity of the nature of Consciousness exists clearly in the state of moksha in Advaita (accepting such a state from the ignorant’s viewpoint and from the empirical viewpoint as from ultimate viewpoint there is neither bondage nor liberation). This is very much and clearly different from “shoonyam” of Shoonyavadin. Thus there is something more than verbal distinction – a seeker should not be stopped at the verbal level but should try to go beyond else all such idiotic questions and objections will arise in the mind.

moxa ityanuvartate Atmano moxe nityaj~nAnasvarUpamastIti vachanena mAyAvAdimatasya shUnyavAdimatAnna kashchidvisheshhaH shUnyavAdibhirapi shUnyAbhinnAtmasvarUpAnuvR^ittermuktAvapi aN^gIkArAt.h anyathA `tad.h bhAvaM yoginaM nayed.h' ityuktaHshUnyabhAvaH kasya syAt.h ? kartR^itvabhoktR^itvapramAtR^itvAdi vishishhTAtmanAshastu mAyAvAdinAmapi sama, iti bhAvaH

"By the mere assertion that the Atman exists in the form of eternal knowledge in Moksa, there is no distinction between the Mayavadins, who make this assertion, and the Sunyavadins. Because the Sunyavadins also admit the existence of an Atman in the condition of Mukti, only they say that this Atman has then the form of Sunya. By Sunya they do not mean absolute non-existence, for otherwise they would not have taught the reaching of this condition of Sunya, in their command, `Tad-Bhavam Yoginam Nayet.'

Sureshwaracharya in his Manasollasa which is a vartika to sankara’s dakshinamurthy ashtakam clearly says that “shoonya” state is a state of voidness or non-existence only and not what the above paragraph tries to prove.

Maybe we could refer to Madhyamaka karika of Nagarjuna for the same. But that also is not required as such because Nagarjuna wrote his works in Sanskrit and thus could never have used “Shoonya” word for an existent entity. This is also strengthened by the fact that he was a great logician and hence would have considered many many times whether using that particular word will cause confusion or trouble. Thus we can clearly conclude that SHOONYA means non-existent state only and not existent state as the dvaitin quotes here.

Sunya, therefore, is a substance according to them: for no one would teach, "Try toreach the un-substantiality.' If the Sunyavadin did not believe in an Atman, then who would reach this condition? What the Sunyavadins mean by the words `the Atman is destroyed in Mukti,' ss that in Mukti, the Atman loses its agency, its enjoyment of fruits,and its reasoning faculty, etc. It is only in these respects, that the Atman is _lost_, and not that there is no Atman at all in Mukti. Therefore, here also there is no difference between the Sunyavadin and the Mayavadin."s

It cannot be said that nobody would because shoonyavadin says so. The main reason could be that when there are no distinctions, there will be no problems (as sruthi also supports) but what Nagarjuna acharya forget was that when distinctions vanish, there still will be the Self left behind as the witness or sakshi.

It seems instead of interpreting his own system properly, the Dvaitin here enters into interpretation of shoonyavadin. The texts of shoonyavadin requires no interpretation at all because the name of the system itself is enough to say that that Atman is destroyed because the final state of emancipation is a state of non-existence.

Thus it cannot be said that he says that Atman’s doership etc. alone are gone – as the Nagarjuna acharya was knowing Sanskrit and would have given that clearly as Sankara gives in his system.

Thus there is clearly a distinction and difference between both systems. The statement “Atman is destroyed in mukthi” and “Atman alone exists in mukthi” are completely different and there requires no interpretation or extra ordinary brain or intellect to understand this.

The objector responds as follows:
nanu yadyapi shUnyavAdina AtmasvarUpamAtramuktAnuvartata ityaN^gIkurvanti na tu tannityaj~nAnasvarUpamiti atovisheshha iti chenna tvanmate.api AtmasvarUpaM nityaj~nAnAtmakaM iti vachanamAtratve na vastugatyA.ayogAt.h tadidamuktaM itivachaneneti Atmano nityaj~nAnasvarUpatvaM kuto na yuktaM, iti chet.h ? na tadA.a.atmasvarUpabhUtaM j~nAnaM savishhayaM nirvishhayaM vA dvItIyaM tAvaddUshhayati

"The Mayavadin says :-- `Though the Sunyavadins admit the mere existence of Atman, in the state of Mukti, yet they do not admit that the Atman has eternal knowledge in that condition. We, Mayavadins, believe that in Mukti the Atman has Nitya Jnana. To this, we reply :-- That according to your opinion also the mere possession of Nityajnana by Atman in Mukti is merely a sentence only, consisting of words, but they convey no meaning. It is merely a verbal statement, and not a real fact. Here the Advaitin may say :-- `Why do you say that it is a verbal statement only?
'To this, we reply :-- `If Atman be of the nature of knowledge,is that knowledge relative to some object known, or is that knowledge unrelated to any object of knowledge?" The second alternative is refuted as follows:
j~neyAbhAve j~nAnasyApyabhAvAt.h
"In the absence of an object of knowledge, there is absence also of knowledge itself."

The point here which the Dvaitin is attacking is related to the triputi – For the process of knowledge, there are three entities or parts – one is the knower or the Subject, second is the Object or the known (what is to be known) and the third is the process of knowing commonly called as KNOWLEDGE. Thus we have Jnaathaa (knower) or Jnaatra, Jneya (object to be known) and Jnaanam (process of knowing).

We never just say Atman is of the nature of eternal knowledge – Atman of the nature of eternal knowledge which is self-known, self-proved and self-luminous – Vedanta terms this as Svamprakaasha. If this point is forgotten, then the objection which the Dvaitin raises will come. Atman or Self doesn’t require any proof to know its existence – it simply exists. It is as good as telling that “I exist” and don’t require any proof of my existence. If there was any proof required for “my” existence, then AMMA or Sankara or Madhva would have to tell me that “sruthi tells that you exist – therefore you exist”J. This is really absurd – the simple reason being that “I am self-luminous” and “self-proven”. Self-proven is called in Vedanta as Svatah praamaanyam – this pramanaa of one’s own existence is self-proven and doesn’t require either sruthi or even Brahman to justify or prove it. On the contrary, even Brahman cannot negate one’s own existence!!! Because such a negation also will be experience by “I” and illumined by “I” alone – as if “I” refuse to read this mail, then the mail is not read – if “I” refuse to accept Brahman, Brahman vanishes – if “I” refuse to have any thoughts, mind vanishes which is what happens in Samadhi state where all thoughts are negated.

Thus we have to first remember that the Self is svayam prakaasha and doesn’t require any proof whatsoever for its existence. Thus Self or Atman is of the nature of Jnaanam but that jnaanam which doesn’t require any proof of knowledge as it is svayam prakaasha.

The Dvaitin is forgetting this and thereby raising objections. The Dvaitin might say here that “I am not forgetting but svayam prakaasha cannot be proved and when the distinction of knower and known vanishes, there is no Consciousness at all – therefore the objections are raised”. If he says so, then we reply that “It has already been proved in the previous sections (mails) that Consciousness is ever-existent and above paragraph proves that Self is svayam prakaasha – of course sruthi also proves – thus your objections are invalid”.

With this we will try to see what the Dvaitin says and try to answer the same. Before answering the same, there requires some explanation as to the objection raised by Dvaitin as it is logical (not high-end logic as found in Nyaayaamrita or Advaita Siddhi but logical enough to confuse normal people like us).

The statement of Dvaitin (objection) is in the form of a question. Vedanta uses such kind of logic wherein the siddhantin himself gives a closed question (which has just yes or no answer – just two options alone) and then proves that either of the options is invalid or illogical.

If Atman is of the nature of eternal knowledge, then two things come into picture:
1. Is this knowledge related to an object – any knowledge has knower and known – therefore what this means is that if atman is of eternal knowledge, is this knowledge related to the known (meaning that does this knowledge know any object other than the Self)?

2.Is this knowledge unrelated to any object – this means knowledge is there but there is no “known” or “object that is known”.

Now, the dvaitin attacks both the above points and shows that both are impossible or illogical – hence the assumption or statement that “atman is of the nature of eternal knowledge” itself is just a veil over the “voidness” of the Atman and meant to just ward off the objections that “mayavada is same as shoonyavada”.

The dvaitin first attacks the second option or alternative:

“there cannot be any knowledge without the Jneeya or object to be known” – knowledge itself presumes or assumes the knower and the known. Since knower is already there (the Self) but the known is not there, therefore knowledge itself doesn’t exist. Concluding in one sentence – “without an object of knowledge or known, there cannot be any knowledge as such knowledge will be non-existent or void only”.

We reply thus to the objection:
What is mentioned as “without the known, there is no knowledge” is completely wrong. This statement has been assumed and based on this assumption, the dvaitin has criticized the tenet of Advaita that “atman is of the nature of CHIT or KNOWLEDGE”. Thus we can very well say that an assumption has been made into a well-proven statement and then based on the wrong assumption, theory has been attacked (without trying to prove the assumed statement).

If the dvaitin here says that “we have already proved that without the known, there is no knowledge as we have already shown that in the absence of triputi or knower, known and knowledge – there will be void alone”, we reply that “we have already refuted it earlier with the example of deep sleep, experience in a dark room, Samadhi avasthaa etc. on the basis of sruthi, yukthi and anubhava”.

Since we have already refuted that in the absence of triputi, there will be voidness – therefore we can extend that refutation here also. Let us now try to analyze a little bit on “knowledge”.

Knowledge or Consciousness has two aspects to it based on its functioning which is illumining things or knowing things (illumining in the case of Consciousness which is not different from knowing in the case of knowledge). Consciousness or CHIT illumines itself as well as other objects. Since Atman or Self is of the nature of eternal knowledge, it knows itself as well as other objects. So the two aspects are 1. Knowing oneself and 2. Knowing other objects.
When there is absence of any object, still the first aspect remains. Thus when there are no objects to know, still there is knowledge present. This is very well proved in the case of electricity – electricity is present in all the bulbs in a room. But if we don’t switch on some of the bulbs, still electricity is there but we will not be able to perceive it in the form of lighting. As bulb is not lit, it doesn’t mean that electricity itself is not there – it is utter foolishness to say so. WE are all people who know science ( the people in the forum know it more than the limited intellect here). Similar is the case with knowledge and knowing objects. Even when there is no “objects to know”, still knowledge does exist as “self-luminous” or “self-knowing”. It is as good as telling that fire has the power of burning only when there are objects to burn!!! Isn’t it completely wrong? Even when there is no object to be burnt, fire still exists. Only thing is the power of burning is not manifested.

This has been clearly mentioned in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in Jyotir Brahmana (4.3.23 – 4.3.30) in beautiful slokas – just quoting one

Yad vai tat na pashyathi – pashyan vai tat na pashyathi
Na hi drasthuh drishthi viparilopo vidhyathe avinaashitvaat

It really doesn’t see (any objects). Seeing, it doesn’t see (here seeing means that seeing itself – this explanation is for the deep sleep state – the Self sees itself in deep sleep state – but it doesn’t see any objects).

The power of seeing is never lost because that power is of the Self which is avinaashi or indestructible (never destroyed).

The “seeing” is extended to “knowing” also in the Upanishad. Thus we can very well say that knowledge does exist without any objects because in such a case, knowledge about one’s own existence is still there.

This has been dealt in detail in the previous mails (which can be referred – while proving that Consciousness does exist when objects are not there).

Thus we can conclude that the second alternative objection is invalid as the basis for the objection which is that “knowledge doesn’t exist when there are no objects” has been refuted.

The dvaitin is again and again repeating the same “assumed” statement but we shall still try to analyze his statements.

AtmasvarUpaM na j~nAnAtmakaM, vishhayashUnyatvAd.h, ghaTavat.h anyathA ghaTo.api j~nAnaM syAdityarthaH atra vishhayashUnyatvaM vishhayAnullekhitvaM natu ullikhitasyavishhayasyA.avartamAnatvaM atyantAsatvaM vA yenAtItAdij~nAne tuchchhAdij~nAne cha vyabhichAriH syAt.h ?

[The mode of reasoning is as follows:] The nature of Atman cannot be knowledge, lacking a subject, as with a pot. For otherwise, there obtains the [ludicrous] position of saying, "This pot is also knowledge" (although no object of its knowledge can be defined).
Also, if it be admitted here that knowledge can exist without asubject, or without a subject possible of specification, would that not be a case of `atyanta-asat.h' (e.g. hare's horns, childless-woman's-son, etc.), or else would there not be excess in case of knowledge of past events, or knowledge of lack of worth, etc.?

First thing is we never say that “nature of Atman is knowledge lacking a subject” but we say that Atman is of the nature of eternal knowledge in that it is self-luminous and illumines other objects too (when they are present as illusions).

And therefore in such a case, there need be no comparison whatsoever with a pot. And also, pot cannot experience its own existence and hence “pot is knowledge” is not accepted by us. Yes, we do accept that pot is also knowledge only as Consciousness pervades the pot in and out – in the form of Brahman (vide the narayana sukta statement – yat cha kinchit jagat sarvam drishyathe srooyathe api vaa – anthar bahischa tat sarvam vyaapva naarayana sthitah – whatever moves in the world is filled in and out by Narayana or the ultimate reality of Brahman).

It is also very easy to come to the conclusion that everything is pervaded by Consciousness because Consciousness is the light that falls on an object and therefore the individual is conscious of the object. Thus Pot is knowledge but with the limitation of name and form. When there is name and form, it is different – remove name and form, it is the same as Brahman or Consciousness or Atman alone which is “knowledge without any known”.

Atman as per us is knowledge without any objects to know (in essence or svaroopa). Since Pot doesn’t have any subject to know itself but the Self is Subject of knowledge itself being self-luminous, therefore the above said objection that “pot is also knowledge” is not really valid in this case and cannot be raised against us.

We never ever say that “knowledge exists without a subject” – seems like the dvaitin again takes to assumptions and assumes things. We only say that the Self is that knowledge which is the knower as well but without any particular entity to know.

The dvaitin might be raising the question of knowledge without subject as described below:

Advaita says Self is without the distinctions of knower, known and knowledge – but Advaita also says Self is knowledge. This means Self doesn’t have any knower or known. Since there is no knower but only knowledge therefore there is no subject but just knowledge. I believe the dvaitin is saying this and thereby giving example of “this pot is also knowledge” when it is not a conscious entity at all.

The above mentioned objection is invalid because we never say that Self is not the knower. We only say that in Self the distinction vanishes but still the KNOWER is there who KNOWS his own KNOWLEDGE or EXISTENCE. Thus we never say that self is knowledge without a subject but only that “Self is the knowledge and the subject of its own knowledge also”. Thus the above mentioned paragraph of objections itself become invalid.

The idea is that just as a hare's horn, or a childless-woman's-son are considered `atyanta-asat.h' ("exceedingly false") for being totally opposed to experience, and being totally opposed to concepts understood from experience, so much knowledge without a known be. Also, given that such knowledge-without-known is accepted for whatever reason, it now becomes impossible to rationalize knowledge as a meaningful concept in a way that also accounts for knowledge that has a subject, such as the past,or the lack of worth of something, etc.

This para also is invalid as this also presumes/assumes that “Advaitic Self is knowledge without a knower or subject”. Thus we don’t really have to analyze into this paragraph where high-end logic is being used and explained in terms of knowledge of past etc. If really people are interested into analyzing this paragraph or are unable to grasp the meaning what the Dvaitin wants to convey, we can discuss it out (only if somebody in the forum want it to – as it is not really essential as it is an invalid objection by the Dvaitin but still if it can give some information/knowledge about some concept, we can go ahead with it).

The objector responds as follows:
nanu vishhayashUnyaghaTasyaj~nAnatvAbhAve.api Atmavishhaya shUnyo.api j~nAnaM astu, ko doshhaH ? na hisarvairbhAvaireka- vidhairbhAvyaM iti niyamo.asti ? yathA.anyoj~nAtA.anyashcha j~neya ityanyatradarshane.api AtmanyaikyaM dR^ishyante tatheti chet.h ? mAmahaM jAnAmIti pramANasadbhAvAt.h tatra tathA kalpanAt.h na cha atra kiJNchit.h pramANamastItyAha
-- However, let it be that things such as a pot cannot have knowledge because there is no subject of knowledge present; however, what is the flaw if the Atman or the shUnya has such knowledge? Indeed, there is no rule that all entities (pot, Atman, etc.) must be of like natures in terms of knowing, thus? Just as even when one knows different things pertaining to different subjects, one still recognizes one as being the same -- thus say you? In that case, as there is the pramANa [the common substrate of cognition] "I know myself," such [identity] can be accepted. However, there is not the least pramANa in the present case; to show this, it is stated:

The above objection is also not valid at all – the purvapaksha statement which the dvaitin raises (saying that the Advaitin responds back) is really invalid and an Advaitin has no reason at all raise such an defending statement because we never accept that Self is knowledge without a subject.

The above two paragraphs are entirely based on the statement that “Self is of the nature of knowledge but doesn’t have any subject”. The reason why dvaitin raises this might be that subject is present only when objects are present. But this is also wrong – subject here means the Subject of Self without any object – that this is possible has been already proved by us through sruthi, yukthi and anubhava earlier.

na hi j~neyarahitaM j~nAnaM nAma asti iti kiJNchinmAnam.h "There is no proof at all that knowledge can exist without an object to be known."

Again another assumption by the dvaitin. Knowledge can very well exist without an object to be known as is experienced in deep sleep & sruthi also tells it. We have already discussed this in detail and proved that knowledge can exist as self-luminous or knowing oneself and without any object to be known. This is in the form “I know myself” – here there is really no object to be known because the subject and object are the same – just knowing that I know, knowing that I exist…… this is what can be called as self-knowing or self-luminous.

And in deep sleep, there are no objects to be known but still knowledge is there. Knowledge is there because after waking up, it is said “I slept well, I didn’t know anything” – thus ignorance and bliss have been known even though there were no objects in that state (ignorance and bliss are modifications/limitations of the mind only and are not really objects as such).

The state of Samadhi is also where there is knowledge about oneself but no objects are there as such.

Thus the above statement is wrong – there are more than enough proof to show that even when objects to be known are not there, knowledge is there.

savishhayakatve.api kiM tatparavishhayaM, svavishhayaM vA ?nA.adyaH paramate moxeparAbhAvAt.h tvanmatevartamAnasyaiva sAxAtsAxivishhayatvAchcha

"If you say that in Mukti there is an object of knowledge, whatis that object? Is that object separate from one's own self, oris it one's own self? It cannot be an object seaprate from one'sown self; for, according to the Mayavadins, there is no otherself-existing in Moksa, except one's own self. Moreover,according to the Mayavadins, only an object existing in thepresent time can become an object of knowledge, but in Moksathere is no time, such as present."

Again assumptions by the dvaitin – we never accept any object of knowledge in Moksha. Yes there is only the Subject which in itself is the object as well as the means – thus the Self is the jnaata or knower, knowledge or jnaanam and jneeyam or known in the Self itself….. Thus there is no object as such in moksha as there knowledge itself is knower and known.

Thus the objection through questioning as “if there is an object of knowledge in mukthi, what is that object” itself is invalid.

But let’s again try to analyze that also. Let’s say the Self is the object of knowledge in mukthi (Self itself being knowledge – we have to remember here that in Vedanta, Self is never objectified and can never be objectified – the only entity that cannot be objectified), then what is that object? Here the question is as to whether the object is separate from the Self or one with it.

1.Object is separate from the Self – in this case, dvaitam or duality will result and against Advaita
2.object is same as the Self – Self becomes an object which is again against Advaita

The above paragraph analyzes the first option that object is separate from the Self. As Advaita accepts only the Self in moksha, this option will surely be against advaita.

This is also wrong because the object separate from the Self is the Self itself (as we don’t accept any object of knowledge other than the knower or subject in moksha or state of realization). Thus this part is very easily refuted as invalid objection.

The dvaitin also attacks another thing – “only an existing object can become object of knowledge, but in moksha there is no time at all” --- we very well accept that only an object currently existing can be an object of knowledge but this is only for vyaavaharika level where time is prevalent. In the realized state, there is no time but still the Self exists & since we never say the Self is an object of knowledge, this objection is also invalid.

In fact, we can see clearly here that the dvaitin is arguing just to prove Advaita wrong – because it is very well known that realization state in Advaita is beyond time & hence that cannot be apprehended as such – there is no pramaana itself in that state as nothing other than Self exists. Since there is no pramaana or means of knowledge, there is no object of knowledge too – thus the objection really becomes invalid or arising due to incomplete knowledge or knowingly trying to accuse/disprove Advaita. ... to be continued.

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM
Hariram

Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 5

2006-05-20T10:43:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM

Humble prostrations to all.

Continuing from what we left previously (the world as perceived by Advaitin is anirvachaneeya whereas it is ASAT from shoonyavaadin’s perspective).

We have to remember here that Advaita never negates the world at empirical level – it gives the world complete status at empirical level. Only at the paaramaarthika level, it negates the world. But Shoonyavaada says that the world is an idea of the mind only and hence they negate the world even at empirical level. This difference is very vast & cannot be taken as the same. That the sutra is not directed against Advaita has already been discussed and concluded by us. Let us proceed further.

At this, the Advaitins may be expected to object, because they say theworld is `anirvachanIya', while the shUnyavAdI says it is `asat.h'; surelythe same sUtra cannot critize both views?

nanvastvevamabAdhyatvenaiva prapaJNchasya svapnAdivaidharmyoktistathApyasmAkaM kathaM tadvirodhaH ? tasya shUnyavAdyabhyupagatajagadasatyatvavirodhitve.api asmadabhimatAnirvanIyatvavirodhAbhAvAditi chet.h ? -- na prapaJNchasya anirvachanIyatvaM vadatA kiM prapaJNcho nAsti, nA.asin.h na bhavishhyati, ityanubhavo aN^gIkriyate, na vA ? dvitIye, na vivAdaH, abAdhyatva avirodhyanirvachanIyatvasya asmAkamapratipaxatvAt.h iti AdyaM dUshhayati --

"[The Advaitin may say we are not Sunyavadins, because we believe that the world is indescribable and ineffable (Anirvachaniya), while the Sunyavadins do not believe so. To them we say, "What do you mean by the world being Anirvachaniya. Do you mean that the world does not exist at all, that it never existed in the past, and that it will never exist in future, and that the experiencing of this truth is the Anirvachaniya. Or do you not believe this. If you say, we do not mean the first alternative, then there is no difference between you and us. But if you say that by Anirvachaniya we mean that state of consciousness in which on realizes that the world neither was in the past, nor exists in the present, nor will ever come into existence in the future, then we answer with the Commentator :--]

" na cha tathA.anubhave shUnyasyAnirvachanIyasya cha kashchid.h visheshhaH

"There is no difference between the experiencing of the Sunya or Void of the Sunyavadins, and the experiencing of the Anirvachaniya by the Mayavadins."

Here comes the real difference. The shoonya of Shoonyavadins is not the Anirvachaniya of Mayavadin – Shoonya is equivalent to Brahman in Advaita (both are not same but what is meant here is that the reality is shoonya as per Nagarjuna and reality is Brahman which is existent as per Advaita).

Shoonya means VOID or nothing really exists which Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka school propounds. Whereas in Advaita, Brahman is not shoonya but it a VASTHU (VASTHU is that which exists beyond time). Brahman remains even when the world seems to be perceived & even when the world vanishes. It is wrong to say that when the triputi or Seer, Seen and act of seeing – there will end up voidness. The witness of triputi is the Self or Brahman which will always remain even if there are no objects or triputi vanishes.

Obviously we have to remember here that Advaita never believes entirely in anirvachaneeya but believes in Adviteeya Brahman alone. The world when perceived by the seeker is explained as Anirvachaneeya – this in no ways makes Anirvachaaneeya the truth of Advaita. Anirvachaneeya itself is an illusion in Brahman only.

Vidyaranya clearly says in Panchadashi that for jnaani, Maya is TUCCHA or non-existent – then where come Anirvachaneeya be compared with the truth or reality of Shoonyavadins which is Shoonya. Also the reality of Shoonyavadins is unreal or non-existence whereas this is not the case with Advaita.

Thus comparisons can never be made on the same. Also there is lot of difference between ASAT and MITHYA (ASAT never exists whereas Mithya seems to exist while it is perceived). Shoonyavaada doesn’t accept a world outside IDEAS or MIND whereas Advaita very clearly accepts the world as REAL (Relatively real at the empirical level). This itself is a huge difference between both.

tathA.anubhavetvayApyaN^gIkriyamANe shUnyavAdyuktajagadasatyatvasya tvaduktAnirvachanIyatvasya cha na kashchidvisheshhaH tathA.anubhavavishhayatve.asatvasyaivaprApteH mayAtAdR^ishA-nubhavAN^gIkArepyasadvailaxaNyaM aN^gIkriyata iti chenna arthakriyAkAritvAdinA tadvailaxaNyasyatanmate.api sattvAt.h tadabhipretapAramArthikasattvAbhAvasya tanmate.api sattvAt.h tathA cha vAN^mAtrabheda evAyaM nArthabheda, iti sUtravirodho durvAra iti bhAvaH

Even on that account, there is not the least distinction between the `asat.h' of the world and its `anirvachanIyatva' according to you. Since in the matter of its experience, only ultimate falsehood is accepted by both of you (the momentary truth being common to both).

This is again wrong – there is lot of difference between unreal and illusory from the empirical viewpoint. From empirical viewpoint, Advaita gives not momentary truth but ultimate truth to the world. It would really be better if the Dvaitin would really go through Advaita and Sankara’s works once again to understand the distinction between vyaavaharika and paaramarthika satta. He is here mixing both together and thereby comparing Advaita with shoonyavaada. Thus from empirical view itself, there are differences between both schools. Also from ultimate view, there is clear difference which we have already seen till now.

"The Advaitin may say :-- `I admit the possibility of this experience, yet the experiencing of the Anirvachaniya is separate and distinguishable from the experiencing of the Sunya, or Void by the Sunyavadins. The distinction lies in the object, in the action, and in the mode of realization. To this, we reply that there is no such difference. The Paramarthika Satta of the Sunyavadin is the same as yours. Therefore, it is only a verbal distinction between you and they, and not a real distinction."

This is clearly a wrong statement arising out of wrong knowledge or knowingly attacking. There is clear distinction between shoonya and Brahman of Advaita.

What does Mandukya Karika say which Sankara and others accept (of course this part of Karika is also considered by the Dvaitin as part of the Upanishad and not a work of Gaudapada)

Anaadi maayayaa supto jeevah yathaa prabudhyathe
Ajam anidram avapnam advaitam budhyathe tadaa

When the jeeva wakes up from the long sleep of MAYA, he realizes advaita or non-duality which is without any birth, without any sleep or ignorance and without any dream or illusions.

This sloka itself is enough to distinguish between Advaita and shoonyavaada.
Sankara says in BSB “Nitya suddha Buddha muktha atmaa aham” – I am the Self which is eternal pure, eternal enlightened and eternally liberated.

Thus the distinction is real and even verbal distinction is there between both. Was Nagarjuna ignorant of Sanskrit that he gave the word “SHOONYA” to his truth???? No, it cannot be because his works are all in Sanskrit. This itself is clear to understand that Advaita and his school are completely different – else he would have given another name to the truth (if it were existent).

At this, the Advaitin may be expected to object that it is improper in terms of context, etc., to quote against the mAyAvAda sUtra that is set out to refute the shUnyavAda:

nanu shUnyavAdinirAkaraNapara sUtravirodho asmAkaM katham.h ? iti chenna sUtranirasanIyAMshasyatvanmate.apisAmyAt.h

However, this sUtra has set out to refute the shUnyavAda; how is it opposed to our doctrine? -- thus say you? No (that is not right). Because the tenet (of shUnyavAda) that is refuted by the sUtra is common to you as well.

We have already analyzed the sutra (Vaidharmyaat cha svapnaadivat – difference is there between waking as objects are really seen and stay for a longer period --- hence there is difference between svapna and jagrat (at the empirical level)).

It is pretty clear that this sutra in no way refutes Advaita --- we have already countered the objection that Sankara is going against his own theory in the commentary on this sutra (the statement that waking world doesn’t vanish in any of the three STATES) by finding out that the word “AVASTHAAYAAM” was left out (knowingly or unknowingly) by the Dvaitin. He obviously forgot that Advaitic Brahman is beyond the three avastaas of waking, dream and deep sleep.

The dvaitin might counter here by saying that even turiya, the Brahman or ultimate state, is also an avastaa. But this is wrong because according to us, Turiya is not at all an avastaa because it is beyond all avastaas as the word itself says. Yes, it is said as FOURTH state in Mandukya just from empirical view and as continuity maintenance wrt to other three states while explaining.

Thus Sankara’s statement is perfectly fine with respect to his theory – but thanks to the dvaitin’s knowing or unknowing misinterpretation, Sankara was accused of having self-contradictory statements and going against his own theory.

However, even if there is something in common in this case to mAyAvAda and shUnyavAda, how do we know that, present other differences, it is still proper to consider the same sUtra as applicable to both overall?

mAyAvAdinirAsAyashUnyavAdinirAsakasUtrodAharaNa ito.api na anupapattirityAha -- "A sUtra that refutes the shUnyavAda is cited against the mAyAvAda,"

there is no even such inappropriateness, to show this, it is stated by our commentator: na cha shUnyavAdinAM tadvAdinAM cha kashchid.h visheshho moxe Then, too, there is not the least difference between your proponents and the shUnyavAdI-s, in terms of the conception of moksha or the state of final release.

There clearly is difference in the state of final release. The final release of shoonyavadin is ending up in shonyam where there is no existence at all but we hold the view that final release is EXISTENCE of the NON-Dual reality of Brahman or Consciousness (which can never be negated not even at any points of time).

tadvAdinAM mAyAvAdinAM mata iti sheshhaH yadyapi mAyAvAdinAM shUnyavAdinAM cha mate AchAravisheshho dR^ishyate, tathA.apishAstravishhayIbhUtaprameye na kashchid.h visheshhaH tathA cha shUnyavAdinirAsakasUtreNa mAyAvAdinirAso na anupapanna, ityarthaH

"Though there is a difference between the Mayavadins and the Sunyavadins, so far as the rules of Achara or social conduct go, yet so far as philosophical doctrines go, there is absolutely no difference between these two schools. Therefore, the Sutra II.2.29 is not irrelevant to the Mayavada position, though that Sutra is primarily intended for the refutation of the doctrine of the Sunyavadins."

The Dvaitin is simply assuming things and coming to a conclusion over here. Speaking in his own term, “so far as philosophical doctrines go” since there is a huge difference between us and the shoonyavadins, this sutra doesn’t refute Advaita. Also we have seen the sutra and its interpretation which in no way refutes Advaita.

Yes, it is a pity that DvaitinsJ cannot even understand small-small and basic things thereby accusing us of being faulty and being in one with shoonyavadins. May Vishnu (of course the supreme Lord of Dvaitins but Brahman in Advaita – this usage of Vishnu is because they don’t accept any Lord as equal with VishnuJ even when Vishnu himself states that everything is same in Gita and other places) protect them from the asuraas of AdvaitaJ (for them Advaitins will go to hell because they don’t accept bhedha – even if Krishna says in Gita many times in 6th chapter to see ONENESS or non-difference, they will accept difference onlyJ and still say that Krishna believes in difference onlyJ Poor Lord Krishna)

nanu shAstravishhayabhUte.api prameye shUnyavAdimatAnmAyAvAdimatasya kuto na visheshha? -- iti chet.h, sa cha visheshhaH kiM pradhAna-phala vishhayAt.h tatsAdhanavailaxaNyA tu paramaprameyavaishhamyAd.h aparaprameyavisheshhAdvA ? AdyapaxaM dUshhayati

-- "How to you say that, philosophically, there is no difference between the Sunyavada and the Mayavada?

To this, we reply:-- that the difference must be either (1) in the conception of the summum bonum by the two schools, or (2) in the methods of practice in realizing this summum bonum, or (3) in the highest conclusion sought to be established by these two schools, or (4) in the difference of conclusions arrived at by these two schools. The commentator shows that the difference does not lie in the first point, namely, in the summum bonum. He says:--"

Let us try to deeply analyze what Advaita has to say about the four points mentioned and after that see what shoonyavaada has to say about the same.

1.conception of summum bonum by the two schools

According to Advaita, the ultimate reality is Brahman which is SAT or EXISTENT, DRIK or SAKSHI etc. whereas in shoonyavada the reality is SHOONYA or unreal or non-existent. Advaita says that the Self or Consciousness never ever ceases to exist and it is Consciousness which is seen as the world as names and forms. The shoonyavadin says that shoonya is the reality and the world is a projection of the mind or ideas alone (note the point alone because Advaita too accepts the world as projection of mind but attributes mixing or illusory mixing of Consciousness with it). About the ultimate reality, the very nature alone is enough to distinguish between them. As per the dvaitin, if there is distinction in any one of these, then difference between the systems will be accepted. Thus we don’t have to proceed to other three pointsJ but for the sake of clarifying and showing that each point will clearly show that both systems are different, we will enter into other points too.

2.Methods of practice

We all very well know that the very basic practice of Buddhist monks is discipline as well as monastic life whereas Advaita never really emphasizes on sanyaas (external sanyaas). Buddhism believes in meditation or intense dhyaana whereas Advaita doesn’t really believe in dhyaana but believes in nidhidhyaasana. Nidhidhyaasana can be done even while typing this mail whereas dhyaana requires proper asana, proper place, proper time of concentration, completing pratyaahara and dharana etc. Thus there are various limitations for dhyaana but no limitation at all for nidhidhyaasana. The only essential practice for Advaita is CONTEMPLATION OF THE REALITY CONTINOUSLY. The way to do this is SRAVANA, MANANA AND NIDHIDHYAASANA. Thus there is clear difference between methods of practice. It cannot be argued that Sankara in his bhashyas and sureshwaracharya in his vartikas have stressed on Sanyaas because in that case why would Sankara in many places say that “I am beyond asramaas” and even comment on Hastamalakeeya gita which clearly says in the first sloka itself that I am beyond all asramaas. Also Anandagiri has very well explained out Sankara’s statements about sanyaas in isha Upanishad that Sankara means to say that Sanyaas is conducive to realization and not essential. Vidyaranya has also clearly mentioned about the same. Sankara accepted Janaka and others are realized – this is possible only if he didn’t consider sanyaas as compulsory for realization. Thus this point also clearly proves both systems of Madhyamaka and Advaita to be different

3.Moksha as per two schools

Moksha obviously is different in both schools because when practice itself is different, the goal also has to be different. Buddhism believes in Nirvaana – a state of joy where there is voidness and this state is achieved through staying away from the world (which they call as sanyaas) whereas Advaitic Moksha is realizing one’s own very nature & advaita never tells to run away from the world. Even Advaitic sanyaasins like Sankara did not run away from the world, but remained in the world and did actions. Thus the final conclusion or state to be achieved is different in Advaita and shoonyavaada. Shoonyaavada believes in Nirvaana to be achieved whereas Advaita believes in Moksha to be realized. Thus there is difference and this point also proves both systems to be differentJ. The Dvaitin has just one more point to prove his statement that Advaita and Shoonyavaada are one and the sameJ. Hopefully he will be successful.

4.Conclusions arrived by the schools

Since moksha itself is different in both schools, therefore there is conclusion in the entire theory of both the schools. This is pretty much clear from the other three points – hence we don’t really need to show that both are different from this point as it is SELF-PROVEN because all the other three points have proved it. Since this point refers to other three, when other three have proved a thing as wrong – the fourth also cannot prove that thing as correct. When three points said both systems are different, this fourth point cannot show that both are same as it depends on the other three points.

There is difference which has been shown already. If it is said both systems are same, then how come Sankara, Sri Harsha, Chitsukha and others took those systems as different and attacked the other system when the other system clearly proved through logic that nyaaya, vaisheshika (which are primarily dualist schools and opponents of Advaita at that time) are wrong???? Advaita could have joined hands with nagarjuna instead they refuted nagarjuna’s theory too.

WE have already seen that both are different. It will become redundant if we go over the same again and again (even it will become boring at times)

Brief parts of the commentary by Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha are as follows:

pradhAnaphalaM hi moxa eva sa cha shUnyavAdinAyAdR^isho abhidhIyate tAdR^isha eva mAyAvAdinA.apyabhidhIyata iti moxe shUnyavAdinAM mAyAvAdinAM cha mate na kashchidvisheshhaH

As it is the case that the primary end, moxa, as described by shUnyavAdins, is also described by mAyAvAdins, there is no difference at all on this account. Moksha as per Advaita has already been shown to be different from shoonyavaada as we have it as not something to be attained as shoonyavadins say but it is something to be realized.

tathA hi mAyAvAdimate hi avidyAstamayo moxaH sAsaMsAra udAhR^ita ityuktyA kiM moxo.avidyAnivR^ittirUpaH uta `brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati' `brahmabhUyAya kalpate' ityAdi shrutismR^itiprAmANyAbhimAnena brahmabhAvaH Adye shUnyavAde.api saMvR^itinivR^ittermoxatvena tadvailaxaNyAbhAvaH

Then, if it be claimed that moxa in mAyAvAda theory is held to be the sublation of the world caused by `avidyA', then is that moxa of the nature of removal of avidyA, or else is it of the nature described in Shruti-Smrti literature such as "knowing Brahman, he becomes a brahman only," "he obtains Brahman," etc.? In the first case, because even in shUnyavAda, moxa is said to be on account of removal of samvR^iti, there is no distinction on this basis.

Moksha is realization of one’s own nature. Thus realization is SVAROPA JNANA. Want to add some points over here before analysis of the dvaitin. Dvaitins and Vishistadvaitins use lot of logic to disprove Advaita when sruthi itself says that the reality is beyond logic in Katha Upanishad. Thus here the dvaitin is trying to use navya-nyaya (high-end logic) to prove that Advaita is wrong. All such high-end logic which the Dvaitin considers cannot be answered have been more than sufficiently answered by Nrsimhaasrama and Madhusudana Saraswathi in Advaita siddhi as well as Brahmananda in Gaudabrahmanandi. Thus all logically questions also can be answered by Advaita but we have to remember that logic cannot clearly show us the Self – it has to be realized as it is SAKSHAAT APAROSHAAT BRAHMA (as Brihadaranyaka says – it is immediate and direct Brahman is the realization of the Self).

Here the various definitions given by advaita acharyas is criticized through logic. These criticisms have been answered in Advaita Siddhi. This definition of Moksha as “sublation of the world caused by avidya” is not directly a definition of Gaudapada because this is valid only at the empirical level. This definition takes into account that “the world exists currently”. But gaudapada and mandukya clearly say that there is no world at all to be sublated – this is the real stand of the Advaitin. Yes, Avidya seems to be there – just blindly follow the path of nidhidhyaasana or use normal and clear logic, you will come to know that there is no Avidya – question us after following such practice. If you say that “I have practiced and still haven’t realized”, then we answer by the way of SAnkara’s Upadeshasaahasri. Sankara replies to that statement “I have also practiced and have realized – this means you haven’t practiced correctly, practice correctly and u will realized” – this statement has been proved and will be proved. “I” (this limited intellect) can beyond doubt assure any person in the world that if they follow what Vedanta says, they will realize the advaitic Self or Brahman as blissful in nature and non-dual (this is not a statement arising out of pride or Ego but a real statement which has been understood by the intellect and realized each and every moment in life).

Thus there is no real sublation of the world as sureswaracharya says that “there cannot be any destruction of avidya but it just vanishes when the reality is known”.

Keeping in mind that we are currently discussing at empirical level which cannot really show Brahman or prove Brahman or moksha, we will analyze the objections.

Yes, sublation of the world caused by avidya is realization.

Now the objector asked:
1. Is it removal of avidya or
2. Is it the nature of the Self or substratum

It is not really removal of avidya but the second way of knowing the ever-known Self which was seeming to be obstructed. Thus first statement, we don’t agree but second we agree.

Thus the first fault of having removal of avidya as same as removal of samvritti of madhyamaka is not there in our case.

I have curtailed the discussion of this point by Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha inthe interests of brevity, but the highlights as I understand them are asfollows: In the second case, where avidyA is not invoked in describing moksha and apurely `saguNa' mukti is attained, there is no mAyAvAda left.

Avidya need not be invoked in describing moksha because there is no real avidya at all. Yes, that avidya is there is in the statement of the objector itself or any person asking what is moksha? Because a jnaani will never ask what is moksha – only an ajnaani will ask what is moksha which itself means that there is ajnaana.

What Vedantic practice does is “removal of this wrong notion that there is ajnaanaJ and therefore tells that there is no ajnaana at all but only Self exists”. Thus such a mukthi wherein avidya is not really invoked will never lead to saguna mukthi as here it is only meant to know that “there is no avidya” but the ever-existent nirguna Brahman exists.

Advaita and sruthi too doesn’t accept saguna and nirguna mukthi – mukthi is one alone and that is Brahmajnaana and Brahmaatma aikya jnaana.]

In the first case, a distinction is not obtained because `samvR^iti' isliterally the same (in Sanskrit) as `avidyA', so "removal of samvR^iti'and "removal of avidyA" must mean the same thing. ("Now, Samvriti has thesame meaning as word Avidya, for samvriti means the obscuration ofknowledge, while Avidya means want of knowledge. Samvriti comes from theroot sam.h meaning compltely, and vR^i `to cover or obscure'." -- S.C. Vasu.)

... to be continued.

A few words on Moksha as per Advaita:

Advaita says that the Self is “nitya shuddha Buddha muktha” and everybody is the Self already. But when the seeker says that he is ignorant, that’s when advaita says about practice – until then it doesn’t say about any practice. Ask any jnaani, does he want moksha or does he want anybody to do something? He will surely say as Ramana that “there is nothing to be done” – this was the same that Sankara too finally ended up with Gaudapada Karika bhashya where gaudapada clearly says

“Na kaschit jaayathe jeevah sambhavo asya na vidhyathe”
There is no jeeva born (jeeva is considered different initially from Brahman – seemingly different) and such a birth is not at all possible.

Thus such jnaanis will never have any doubts. But the seeker has many doubts for which he seeks moksha through answers and realization. Thus he is instructed to follow SRAVANA, MANANA and Nidhidhyaasana.

What are the three & their roles:
Sravana is to know about the reality as such – this removes SAMSHAYA or doubts regarding the reality. Here the shishya is instructed that TAT TVAM ASI or THAT THOU ART.

Manana is to reflect upon the truth through logic – after hearing there is ASAMBHAAVANA or the thought that “such a reality which is non-dual is not possible as I see duality”. This is removed through anvaya vyatireka yukthi as well as viveka of pancha koshaas etc.

Nidhidhyaasana is contemplation on the reality – after reflecting, still duality is seen and thus the seeker concludes “there is nothing as non-dual reality as I see duality” – this is removed through contemplation when he realizes that there is nothing other than the non-dual self – verbally the world simply vanishes for such a person as he sees oneness everywhere/ The fault removed here is VIPARYAYA or wrong knowledge or contrary knowledge.

Thus these three steps are for removing SAMSHAYA, ASAMBHAAVANA and VIPARYAYA and not for gaining the Self.

These three steps remove avidya by showing the seeker that there is no avidya at all. A person thinks he is something else as he has forgotten himself. Thus he is told “You are THAT” – here the wrong notion or forgetfulness is told to be removed only from the perspective of the ignorant person. There never was any ignorance as the person was always the tenth man only but still there seemed to be ignorance which was removed. Thus really speaking, there is no removal of avidya as avidya has no existence at all – this can really be understood only by practice and anubhava – not in words.

For empirical level, avidya is said to be removed because the seeker has avidya and thinks there is avidya – thus there is no fault in this approach too.

A person has to remember that Advaita can be understood only through open-mindedness and using logic without any prejudice – at last it can be experienced only through constant practice of seeing everything as one and realizing the Self – until then, nothing can be really said about it as we are currently in empirical level and trying to talk about paramarthika satyam.

We will continue with Shrisha rao’s third posting next. Currently let us all try to do intense sadhana to realize the non-dual reality. Intense sadhana is not tapas for 5 or 6 hours but it is constant remembrance of the reality that “there is only Brahman here, the world is only an illusion and the jeeva is Brahman only, not different from Brahman” – remembering this reality, let us try to see that Brahman everywhere & thereby realize our own very nature of Consciousness or Brahman or Self.

Prostrations to all.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 4

2006-05-20T10:32:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM

Humble prostrations to all.

Let us now continue further and start with the second mail of Shrisha Rao. Before continuing, some of us (at least some) might be thinking that “nobody is really reading these and hence why is this person typing all these – if nobody reads it, it will be useless and waste” --- Nothing is really waste or useless here because everything is filled with Lord. This work of analyzing Shoonyavada and Mayavaada is an offering to AMMA and no offering is a waste as it helps the seeker to purify the mind, know more about the topic and be constantly immersed in the ultimate reality of Self (posting or discussing is a form of manana and nidhidhyaasana).

... continued from previous part. In this previous part,

it was urged that the sUtra `vaidharmyAchcha nasvapnAdivat.h' must equally refute both the mAyAvAda and the shUnyavAda,for it to refute anything at all. It may be noted in this regard thatas B.N.K. Sharma records in the HDSV (p. 54, 2d ed.), "under the sUtra`vaidharmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h' even a confirmed Monist like Samkaraforgets his own mental reservations and observes that `the objects of thewaking state are *not* similarly sublated (as in a dream) *at any time*
(\footnote: naivaM jAgaritopalabdhaM vastu kasyAJNchidapyavasthAyAMbAdhyate)."

The answer to this objection is there in the very words quoted by the objector as was bolded in the previous mail on the same. “Kasyaanchit api avasthaayaam baadhyathe” – “It doesn’t vanish in any avasthaa”. Here we have to note the word “Avastha” used and it is not “at any time” which is wrong interpretation by B N K Sharma. Sankara only says that the waking world doesn’t vanish in any of the avasthaas – in dream, waking world is dormant and hence it comes back after waking up. Thus Sankara means to say there is continuity and waking world doesn’t vanish in “any avasthaa” – the word Sankara uses is “Avasthaayaam” meaning “in avasthaa”, kasyaanchit means “in any”, api is to enforce or say “surely” and “badhyathe” means sublation or vanishing.

Thus here it is wrong interpretation of the Dvaitin and he twists Sankara’s bhashya to mean “at any time” rather than “in any avastha or state” as Sankara very clearly mentions. WE see and scriptures too tell that the waking world vanishes only after realization and thus it is present in all the avasthas which are waking, dream and deep sleep. But that which is beyond all these three avasthas is “Turiyaa” which is avasthaateeta and it is in this state that the world vanishes as Mandukya clearly mentions “Prapanchopashama shivah advaita” – when the world vanishes, there is only Self which is auspicious and illumination – it is also non-dual in nature. It cannot be argued here that Turiyaa is mentioned as the FOURTH state or CHATURTHAM – this is mentioned only in comparison or relative to the other three states – really speaking it is not a state at all as the word “advaita” and “prapancha upashama” is used.

To recapitulate what we have seen so far, briefly, it was initiallyclaimed by Srimad Acharya that the sUtra `vaidharmyAchcha nasvapnAdivat.h' is a criticism of mAyAvAda. This was objected to by theones criticized on the grounds that the sUtra is intended to criticize theshUnyavAda, not the mAyAvAda.

This was responded to by the Acharya by saying that the aspect of shUnyavAda criticized by the sUtra is alsocommon to the mAyAvAda, hence the sUtra must criticize the latter as well. The mAyAvAdins then said that because they admit of a momentary or lowerreality to the world, while the shUnyavAda holds only the shUnya to beReal, the sUtra can only criticize the latter. To this, our commentatorresponded that a momentary reality in respect of the world is alsoadmitted by the shUnyavAdins, so the sUtra would be no critique of themeither under those circumstances; assuming the sUtra to be meaningful, itmust criticize the entire idea that the world is not completely, primarilyReal.

To recapitulate, the Dvaitin hasn’t first got the two levels of reality clearly and thereby all the opposition and refutations come. If this is clearly understood, then there will be no questions whatsoever. First thing is the two levels of reality of “Empirical” and “Ultimate” can never be mixed together. Both of them are separate and a person cannot mix those – even a person cannot say “I am feeling hungry now so I will eat in dream”JJ. Isn’t this illogical in itself??? Yes, it is. Remembering that both levels of reality cannot be mixed, the sutra refutes the shoonyavaadin who don’t even accept reality to the world (even empirical). They say empirically also it is only temporary and unreal whereas Advaita accepts full reality to the world at the empirical level but only sublates it at the ultimate level.

Most part of the previous mail in the series and this mail too are related to this alone. But then also, we will try to analyze itJ. If a seeker finds things being repeated each time, it is only a way to making the reality more clear by repetition as each one of us would have learned various subjects in school and college by repeating it many times (along with meaning thoughJ and not merely by-hearting).

At this point in the discussion, Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha presents thepUrva-paxa again:

nanu prapaJNchasyoktabAdhAbhAvarUpeNa sautrAdipadopAtta rajjusarpAdivailaxaNyasaMbhave.api svapnavailaxaNyoktirna yujyate `na tatra rathA' ityAdinAsR^ishhTyuktyA svapna-padArthasya satvAditi chenna svapnashabdena atra svApnapadArthe AropitajAgrattvagrahaNAt.h tasya cha rajjusarpAdivadbAdhyatvAt.h

"(An objector says :-- The objects of dream are also caused by the Lord; how can they be unreal? They must be as real as the objects of waking consciousness. To this, we reply that by the word "dream" in that Sutra is meant "the _idea_ of attributing the reality of waking consciousness to the dream consciousness." It means that when a person is dreaming, he thinks and wrongly thinks, that the objects which he is seeing in the dream are the very same objects which exist in the waking world. This notion is wrong. The true idea would when the dreamer will think the dream objects to be what they really are, namely, that they are dream-objects created by the Lord, for that particular individual, and that they are not waking objects."

A few words need to be said about DREAM according to Dvaita. Advaita’s strong fold is analysis of dream and comparing it with the waking state. And as experience very well proves that dream is unreal and is in the dreamer alone, therefore the rival systems of Dvaita and Vishistadvaita had but one say on it – DREAM IS REAL. A pretty easy way to prove Advaita wrong not directly but by propounding that Dream is not unreal as Advaita claims but is real.

Firstly advaita considers dream as unreal and present in the dreamer. Thus the controller or Ishwara of Dream is the jeeva alone. The Jeeva is the creator, the substratum and the controller of Dream. Jeeva is the nimitta or efficient as well as upaadaana or material cause of dream.

Dvaita system says that dream is real as it is experienced and sruthi also says so. Dream is not under the control of Jeeva but is under the control of Ishwara. Ishwara controls dream. Dream has two factors as per Dvaita – Ishwara’s will & samskaaras or latent tendencies (Advaita accepts only latent tendencies). The simple reason for bringing in Ishwara is that Jeeva doesn’t control the dream world as everything happens similar to waking and is not under his control. Therefore Ishwara controls dream as Madhva quotes various puranas in support of this in the Bhakthi paada of Brahma Sutra (3rd chapter 2nd paada) as well as Katha Upanishad statements too to prove the same.

“Sandhye sristhiraaha hi” – “at the middle point between deep sleep and waking, there is creation as scriptures point out” & this is attributed to Ishwara alone.

But if we analyze, this is against experience and logic too. Experience shows that there is no creator apart from the dreamer in dream because he is not able to perceive or infer about such a controller (whereas in waking state, we can infer about Ishwara as the Naiyyaayikas do). Also this is against logic as how can such a Ishwara do things which are beyond any logic as well as against even normal laws. The laws in dream are created by the dreamer alone as one day we fly and another day we can’t fly etc.

Thus Ishwara is not the creator of the dream world and the dream world is not real.

If we see here, in this sutra the Dvaitin clearly misinterprets and twists the sutra word “svapnaa” as the explanation in the above paragraph says. When the word has direct meaning as “dream”, it is interpreted wrongly. And if the Dvaitin here says that here it is not the direct meaning but indirect meaning has to be taken – this is against his own principle. This is against his principle because according to the Dvaitins, Advaitins always commit the fault of ignoring the direct meaning and taking resort to indirect meaning – this objection thus will be valid for the dvaitin in the interpretation of this sutra. You are wrong because you do wrong – I am not wrong even if I do wrong - What a real foolish approach is followed here!!!!

Therefore, the refutation of shUnyavAda in `vaidharmyAchcha nasvapnAdivat.h' must imply the refutation of mAyAvAda as well.

We have already seen that neither Sankara’s bhashya nor the tenet of Advaita is valid for being refuted in this sutra. The refutation thus is only for the shoonyavaadin – it is only the dvaitin who wants to put the advaitin into a nook through claim that this sutra refutes advaita too.

PS: Hope at least a single person has read the article till this line (of course excluding this limited intellect titled “Hariram”). Even if no, still there are no issues as everything is Brahman and this writing of the article is an offering to the Lord which never is waste (if others don’t read also it is not useless).

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 3

2006-05-20T09:56:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

Last posting on the same ended with the below statement

“About experiences of joy and suffering as illusory, will be taken up in the next posting on the same.”

Let’s analyze joy and suffering in life. It is very simple indeed to prove that it is illusory. Taking the example of dream, everybody very well knows that the joy and suffering in DREAM is only an illusion – yes, the dvaitin might say that they are real and twist sruthi statements to suit the same & also give various anumaana tarkas to prove the same – but one’s own experience goes against it (perceptual experience). Since dvaita accepts pratyaksha as much as sruthi, therefore here we can take pratyaksha to be valid and interpret the various sruthis in the proper way to get to the conclusion that “dream is an illusion & therefore joy and suffering in dream are only an illusion”. Advaita never says to neglect pratyaksha or anubhava – it only tells a person not to completely believe it as anubhava can be mithyaa or bhrama also as we all very well know the case of snake seen in rope & water seen in desert. It is interesting to note here that the very famous Bhamathi in clear terms mentions in Adhyaasa Bhashya (introductory commentary of Sankara on BSB) part itself that “hundreds of sruthi cannot change a pot to a cloth” – thus vasthu ever remains a vasthu even though the SEER is unaware of the VASTHU. Similarly illusion remains an illusion whether a person knows it or not.

Ok, so we have concluded successfully that joy and suffering in dream is only an illusion. Now, the waking world is also considered as similar to dream world as both the experiences are very much similar and there are sruthi statements which clearly negate the world after realization. Sankara gives an anumaana or inference to prove that the world which one currently perceives is an illusion.

The world is an illusion, since it is perceived, like dream world.

The dream world is an illusion which we have already proved – now the waking world is similar as the dream world because both are SEEN or perceived. Thus waking world is also an illusion. Anything SEEN is not a real VASTHU because it changes & anything changing is not eternal and only temporary. Anything temporary was not present yesterday and will not be present tomorrow. Thus it only seems to exist today & it’s logical to conclude that “today also it never really exists as if it really exists, it should never vanish”. Any sruthi clearly mentions in various places that the SELF is never seen or perceived.

YATHO VAACHO NIVARTHANTHE APRAAPYA MANASAA SAH – says Taittiriyam
Where words and thoughts don’t reach, that is the Self

YAD TAD ADRESHYAM AGRAAHYAM – says Mundakam
That which is not reached or thought about by the sense organs and non-perceived by the mind also.

Yad vaacha anabhyuditam yena vaad abhyudathe
TAdeva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yad idam upaaasathe – says Talavakara Upanishad (Kena Upanishad which forms a part of Talavakara Brahmana)
That which is not explained through words since it itself is that which gives word the power of speaking – know that alone to be BRAHMAN and not that which is mentioned to be worshipped as “THIS” (here we can clearly say that Saguna and Savishesha is clearly negated by the sruthi and even condemned).

The above sloka is repeated some 6-7 times in kena Upanishad with mind, eyes, ears, praana etc.

Thus the SELF is the only object in the world which is never an object of perception or through any other pramaanas – the Self is never experienced as an object because it is the changeless Subject (which is only a witness to the relation of Subject-Object) which illumines the entire realm of objects.

Thus we have proved now that the waking world is also an illusion like dream world. Since waking world is an illusion, joy and suffering should also be an illusion only.

Also the same logic of “being temporary” can be used to show that joy and suffering are illusory only.
“If they are illusory, then why does a person experience it & they are real because sruthi also mentions them”

Those sruthi statements are also negated by the other above sruthi statements from which it can be deduced that there is no joy and suffering really for the individual.

This is also mentioned by Sri Krishna in many places in Gita where he says the Self or jeeva is not at all affected (in the 13th chapter) by things in the world or emotions.

Shankara reads `asatyamapratishhThaM te' in his gItAbhAshhya as referring to the chArvAka doctrine (`lokAyatadR^ishhTiH iyam.h') but this is a red herring; that the materialists could not possibly be the referents of the criticism there is known from the very first adjective applied: `asatyaM ... te AhuH jagat.h' -- the materialists have a very robust belief in the reality of the world, thank you very much, although they could plausibly stand accused of many other sins. Thus, they are not the ones criticized for saying that the world is `asatyam.h'.

Here Sankara’s bhashya as well as the gita sloka is not properly understood. As also the stand of Advaita against other schools is also not understood. The sloka has two words in the beginning which if clearly understood, then the fault or accusation against Advaita will not be made. ASATYAM APRATHISTAM – Asatyam means it is unreal as the opponent states. But the second word clearly says what ASATYAM really means, APRATHISTAM means baseless and hence the next few words say that there is no God for the world. The materialists don’t really accept anything real about the world also as their only reality consists in body and its pleasures (this is what this limited intellect has understood about them). And thus Sankara is not wrong. And again the second word of “baseless” and “aneeshwaram or godless” is completely against Advaita which accepts a base for the world as well as an abhinna nimitta upaadana for the world (creator-controller-destroyer). Thus it is wrong to allege Advaita over here. Also Advaita never says that the world is unreal (from the empirical view). It only says that the world cannot be real from paramarthika level. At empirical level, Advaita clearly accepts the world as well as various activities in the world as is clearly seen in Sankara’s activities on Earth and his various works.

Anandagiri in his sub-commentary on this sloka clearly says that this is for those who consider the prakrithi as existing apart from Brahman and independent (this cannot be Sankhya as they don’t accept Prakrithi alone but accept Purusha as well which is separate from body). Thus using Parishishta Nyaaya, this statement can be meant against MATERIALISTS alone.

Thus the objection here that this statement is directed towards Advaita is wrong.

At this point Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha presents an objector's position asfollows:

nanu yadyapi idAnIM sukhAdikaM mithyA ityanubhavo nAsti, tathApi uttaratraitat.h sukhAdijagannAsInnAstinabhavishhyatItyanubhavo vedAntajanyashcharamasAxAtkArarUpo bhavishhyati tenaiva jagato bAdhyatvarUpamithyAtvasiddhiH na cha shrutyAdivirodhaH vyAvahArikasatvaparatvAttasya pratyaxaM tu vartamAnamAtragrAhi- trikAlabAdhAbhAvagrAhakaMneti natadvirodho.api tathA cha kathaM jaganmithyAtvemAnAbhAvastadvirodhashcha? -- ityata Aha, `na cha' iti Transl. by S.C. Vasu

(wherever used hereafter, presented in quotes): "Admitting that in our present state of existence there is no perception of the unlreality of pleasure and pain, yet in some future condition there will arise the realization that pleasure and pain are unreal, and that the world never was, nor is, nor will exist in future; and that this is the highest teaching of Vedanta, and it is perceived as a direct intuition when that stage of evolution is reached. This experience of Vedanta realization is a proof in favor of the unlreality of the world. Nor does this experience contradict those sacred texts which maintain that the world is real. Those texts refer to the reality of the world in vyAvahArika sattA only, namely, they apply to the ordinary unillumined condition of mankind. The real truth is that the world is unreal.

To this, the author says:
" nachaitannA.asIdastItyanubhavaH kadAchid.h bhavishhyatItyatra kiJNchinmAnam.h "There is no proof that anybody has ever experienced or will ever experience in some future condition that the world is unreal, and that it neither was in the past, nor exists in the present, nor will come into non-existence in future. (No one has had any such experience, nor is there any proof that such an experience is possible in future.)"

This is what is called ARROGANCE – when great Mahatmas like Sankara, AMMA and others very clearly say that they experience that there is no world as well as Sanatkumara in Chandogya and Yajnavalkya in Brihadaranyaka clearly mention this – but still if people don’t agree, the only reason could be “I don’t want to accept it and I will not accept it at any cost”!!!

There has been experience and any person can experience it that the world never really exists. Also, there is more than sufficient proof given by Gaudapada and Yoga Vasistha clearly mention about unreality of the world. What is the reason “Adau anthe cha yat na asthi varthamaane api tat tadaa” – that which is not present in the beginning and at the end, it is not present in the middle too. Isn’t this proof enough through logic???? Haven’t we seen a baby in the form of body getting formed, seeming to exist & then dying off – can we give any proof of such a body’s existence currently (we cannot – and never can we give proof for the same).

Thus logic itself is enough to prove that the world doesn’t exist really.

Once again, Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha presents an objector's perspective:

yaduktaM jaganmithyAtvaM `vaidharmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h' iti sUtraviruddhaM iti, tadayuktam.h sUtrehi prapaJNchasya svapnAdivaidharmyamuchyate tachchaprapaJNchasya kiJNchitkAla sthiratvenaiva svApnapadArthasyAshutaravinAshitvAt.h kiJNchit.h kAla sthiratvamAtraM charasmAbhirapi prapaJNchasyAN^gIkriyate tasya shUnyavAdyaN^gIkR^itAtyantAsatvavirodhitve.api asamad.h abhimatamithyAtvAvirodhitvAdityata Aha
--"The Sutra of Badarayana II.2.29, quoted by you, is wrongly applied by you. In that Sutra, the world as it exists is shown to be real, in the sense that it has a *temporary* reality, and does not vanish so quickly as a dream-world. Therefore, that Sutra says this world has not the characteristics of the dream-world. But all the same, it is unreal, for it vanishes after some time. Moreover, that Sutra is a refutation of the Doctrine of the Madhyamikas or the Sunyavadins or nihilists, who maintain that everything is void and nothing whatever is real. It is not a Sutra directed against the Advaitins or Mayavadins. The Commentator, therefore, shows that there is no difference between the Sunyavadins and the Mayavadins in this respect: --

"kiJNchitkAlasthiratvamAtrasya shUnyavAdinAmapi siddhatvAd.h`vaidharmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h' ityAdivachanaM vyarthaM syAt.h ?
Because the quality of being present *for some time only* is also accepted by the shUnyavAdins, the statement `vaidharmyAt.h cha na svapnAdivat.h' would become worthless.

Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha explains this as follows:
yadyatra sUtre kiJNchitkAlasthiratvamAtreNa prapaJNchasya svapnAdivaidharmyamuchyate tadAtatsUtraMshUnyavAdinirAkaraNaparaM na syAt.h ? -- kiJNchitkAlasthiratvamAtreNasvapnAdivaidharmyasya shUnyavAdinAmapi siddhatvAt.h tathA cha tatsUtraM vyarthaM syAdityarthaH etena prapaJNchasyavyAvahArikasatvena svapnAdi vaidharmyoktirityapinirastam.h vyAvahArikasatvasya etenApi aN^gIkriyamANatvAt.h yathoktaM shUnyavAdinA --
`sattvaM tu dvividhaM proktaM sAMvR^itaM pAramArthikam.h sAMvR^itaM vyavahAryaM syAt.h nivR^ittau pAramArthikam.h '-- iti

"(If you say that we, Mayavadins, believe that the world has permanency for some little time, then we reply) that the Sunyavadins also believe that for a _momentary_ period, the world has some permanency, and that the Sutra II.2.29 equally refutes the Mayavada as well as Sunyavada, otherwise that Sutra would become redundant. For, if that Sutra II.2.29, meant to say that the waking-world differs from the dream-world in having a temporary reality, while the dream-world has not even that temporary reality, then that Sutra would be no refutation of Sunyavada. Because the Sunyavadins also believe that the world has a temporary existence and is not absolutely void. Since the Sunyavadin also believes in the temporary existence of the world, therefore the Sutra II.2.29 must be taken to mean that the world is *permanently* real, and not temporarily real; that it is not a Vyavaharika Satta, but a Paramarthika Satta. The Sunyavadins say:

'The reality is said to be of two sorts, the obscured and the transcendental; The obscured or Samvritam reality is the Vyavaharika or empirical reality, while the total secession is the absolute reality,' thus." The `sattvaM tu dvividhaM proktaM' verse attributed to the shUnyavAdIliterature is quoted from the tattvodyota. B.N.K. Sharma reports that theverse is not presently available in its original source as the ancientBuddhist works are mostly lost, but enough evidence remains in the extantBuddhist literature, such as Nagarjuna's:

The sloka of Buddhism quoted cannot be taken for granted as it is not found and might be a cocked up story alone. As mentioned earlier, most of the above objection will vanish when the two divisions of SATTA as per advaita is known clearly. The world is given temporary reality in shoonyavada, so says the objector. But Advaita never gives the world a temporary reality – it gives the world permanent reality at the empirical level. Only when a person reaches the ultimate, the world is given an unreality status. This is the reason why all actions are accepted at the empirical level. Also the Buddhist say that the world is concept in the mind whereas Advaita clearly accepts that the world exists (at the empirical level). The Buddhist instead say the world is not there really and is temporarily real at the empirical level.

As the difference between Svapna and Jagrat – this has been explained by Sankara in his commentary and Panchadashi too. The waking world experiences are “Sthiram” whereas Svapna is “asthiram”. Again this differentiation is from the empirical level only. Thus there is difference which Veda Vyaasa clearly says in the sutra as “Vaidharmyaat cha na svapnaadivat”. If Sankara’s commentary on the same is read and understood the objections will never be raised. “Why Vaidharmya?” “Badha abaadhau ithi” – The Svapna experience vanishes completely after waking up. But the waking experience never vanishes, not in any of the avasthaas (this statement might seem against basic theory of Advaita itself but read carefully the last part which has been bolded for the purpose – Sankara doesn’t say the waking experience never vanishes but says never vanishes in any of the three avasthaas of Jagrat, Svapna and Sushupthi). Thus there is clear difference between the two which Vyaasa mentions. Vyaasa never mentions that waking world is real but only says empirically real as else it will contradict yukthi and sruthi. Sruthi can never be fault and against logic – as we have already given the logic for illusory nature & thereby unreality of the world – Vyaasa, a great saint and considered Avatar can never make a mistake to say that the world is real and that is the difference between svapna and jagrat that jagrat is real whereas svapna is not. (Sankara’s commentary says Na evam jaagarithopalabdham vasthu sthambhaadikam kasyaanchitapi avasthaayaam baadhyathe).

If the above paragraph is clearly understood, there will be no objection as what Vyaasa meant was to show that the waking world and dream world are different from each other and criticizing the Buddhist school which says “everything is an idea of the mind” and thus denies even external or temporary reality to the world.

sattvaM tu dvividhaM proktaM sAMvR^itaM pAramArthikam.h loke saMvR^itisatyaM cha satyaM cha paramArthataH
-- to show that it not a fabrication.

It is also of interest that Gaudapada, thought by Surendranath Dasgupta and others as "himself a Buddhist," uses the world `samvR^itti' in addition to `mAyA', in like sense (remember that the accusation is`mAyAkhyayA saMvR^itimabhyadhatta' -- `samvR^iti' was renamed as `mAyA'):

antasthAnAttu bhedAnAM tasmAjjAgarite smR^itam.h yathA tatra tathA svapnaM saMvR^itatvena bhidyate (GK II-4)

Continuing with Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha's subcommentary:
tarhi kena prakAreNa svapnAdidharmyaM prapaJNchasya sUtre.abhipretamityata Aha --
There, in what manner is the likeness to a dream of the world expressed by the sUtra? -- to answer this, it is said:

ato na kadAchidasya nA.asIdasti bhavishhyati ityanubhavo bhavishhyatItyabhiprAyeNaiva tadvachanam.h

Therefore, the statement (`vaidharmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h') is directed at those who propound the view that "the world did not exist, does not exist, and will not exist," such experience will occur

The above objections are also met because from the empirical view Advaita accepts the world as real unlike Buddhist who deny even temporary reality at the empirical level to the world.

We shall continue with the second mail of Shrisha Rao in the next mail in the series.

HARI AUM

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 2

2006-05-20T07:15:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

Continuing the critical analysis of the criticism that “shoonyavaada” is equal to Advaita (again here refraining from using the word “Mayavaada” as Advaita is never a Mayavaada philosophy – pardon the usage of the word Mayavaada in the subject line in order to have it the same name as in the web site).

This series is further continued as below:

In addition to the tattvodyota which is pointed to by Dr. Sharma, I'maware of two other works, the anu-vyAkhyAna, the well-known metrical comm. on the Brahma Suutra, and the bR^ihad.h-bhAshhya, where the charge is madeand a proof attempted. As noted by Dr. Sharma and also previously on thislist, the charge is made in brief in the sumadhva-vijaya (chapter 1)against Shankara that he was a crypto-Buddhist:

The various works of Madhva use Tarka to a large extent than it should be used – anu vyakhyana is a commentary on the Brahma Sutra and this work doesn’t deal much with the Dvaita philosophy, instead it deals most of its part in critically refuting other systems through high-end logic (hair-splitting logic as is seen in the dvaita work Nyaayamrita of Vyaasateertha). Of course, I have personally read Tatparya Chandrika of Vyaasateertha which is based on and is a summary of anu-vyakhyana as well as Jaya Teertha’s tika on Madhva’s anu bhaashya on Brahma Sutras. Most of the criticism or objections in the work are clearly refuted or proved wrong when the system of Advaita is clearly understood with an open-mind.

avaidikaM mAdhyamikaM nirastaM nirIxya tatpaxa supaxapAtI
tameva paxaM pratipAduko.asau nyarUrupan.h mArgamihAnurUpam.h 50
On perceiving that the anti-Vedic mAdhyamika [doctrine] was destroyed, and being highly partial towards it, he (Shankara) propounded the very same thesis in disguise as a ruse to bring it once again.

Dr. Sharma himself claims that the dvaitins are not passionate but give sufficient logic enough to substantiate their stand whereas Advaitins are too passionate and just keep on repeating their stand like a parrot without even trying to refute. Such claim of Sharma itself is contradicted in the above sloka where a passionate claim is made without analyzing Sankara’s philosophy with an open-mind. As we have already seen, each of the criticism can be very clearly refuted through logic itself. Another important thing to be noted here is that Sanatana Dharma believes in “live and let live” and not “kill others and live oneself” which is very much evident in the dvaitins works and their attitude. Sankara and Advaitins can very well claim to strictly follow the Sanatana Dharma and its principles because even in Brahma Sutras Sankara’s doesn’t spend much effort to refute other systems except in the second chapter which itself has Vyaasa refuting other systems. Sankara does mention some Vedantins and refutes their views but this is very small compared to the entire content of Sankara’s bhashya. Moreover as Madhaveeya Sankara digvijaya states, Sankara united the 72 sects which were prevalent during his time in Hinduism under the title of Advaita which even today accepts other philosophies as being valid in the respective plane or level.

asatpade.asansadasadviviktaM mAyAkhyayA saMvR^itimabhyadhatta brahmApyakhaNDaM bata shUnyasiddhyai prachchhannabauddho.ayamataH prasiddhaH 51
The `asat.h' [of the Buddhist] was called `sadasadvivikta' (i.e., `sadasadvilaxaNa'), and by `mAyA' was referred the `samvR^iti'; Alas! Even the Brahman (who is to be worshipped as of eternal attributes, for one's salvation, per the Yajur Veda's `eshha nityo mahimA brahmaNasya', `tasyaiva AtmA padavittaM viditvA', etc.) was equated to the `shUnya' or Void (i.e., given the exact same characteristics of a total lack of any attributes, being the possessor only of illusory, inconstant attributes, being unable to be conveyed by speech, etc.) -- thus he (Shankara) is known as a crypto-Buddhist.

This is again a wrong criticism of the philosophy propagated by Sankara. Sankara and even Gaudapada never believes in a shoonya object as the final termination or moksha leading to such a void object – instead Sankara as well as Gaudapada again and again stress that there will be only pure Existence present after moksha. Saying that there will be nothing and that there will be Existence alone is completely different – it is alas pathetic enough to see intellectual people finding it difficult or unable to apprehend this difference itself. (we have to remember over here that an Advaitin never really refutes other philosophies because all philosophies are valid at the empirical level and Advaitin is really ready to accept any philosophy at the empirical level – this is very well seen through Vachaspathi Mishra, Vidyaranya, Appayya Dikshitar and others writing works on other systems even though they were staunch Advaitins).

The quality of Brahman or Nirvishesha and Nirguna Brahman which Sankara propounds and the shoonya which Buddhists propound are completely different. How does Sankara define Brahman? Nitya Suddha Buddha Mukta Svabhaavam – this definition itself is about a Vasthu which means an “existent entity” and not a shoonya or voidness. Thus the Brahman of Advaita and shoonya of Buddhist have different characteristics.

Yes, in both the cases, there is lack of attributes, unable to be conveyed by speech etc. but that in no way proves that the object which Sankara points out is “void”. It can also mean that which is the Subject & hence cannot be objectified – and always Subject is not non-existent but it is existent. Thus considering the characteristics of shoonya and Brahman as same is nothing but utter foolishness (just to mention, whatever attributes Sankara gives to Brahman is from the sruthi only & he is not quoting his own definition of the reality).

In fact, later, the su-vi fulminates against Shankara in no uncertainterms:
svasUtrajAtasya viruddhabhAshhI tadbhAshhyakAro.ahamiti bruvan.h yaH
taM tatxaNAdyo na didhaxati sma, sa vyAsarUpo bhagavAn.h xamAbdhiH !!
Being the holder of views opposed to His sUtra-s, and yet claiming "I am his commentator" -- that he (Shankara) was not instantly incinerated, is because the Lord in the form of Vyasa is as an Ocean of mercy. Strong words, no doubt, but on a fair assessment, there is little tocontradict them except for pious posturing in favor of Shankara. Considerthat the Br. Su. explicitly rejects all the pet theories of Advaita in nouncertain terms:

Here comes out the real difference between a follower of Sanatana Dharma and a person who claims to be the true interpreter of VedantaJ. Advaitin never gives any such contention against other systems. Ramanuja’s criticisms against Advaita in Sri Bhashya, Vedanta Desika’s criticism in Shata Dhooshani (these were written in the 12th as well as 14th century) were not defended until M M Ananthakrishna Sastri in the 19th century. Even Madhusudana Saraswathi avoids usage of bad or harsh words in his AdvaitaSiddhi unlike the work of Nyaayamrithi which is being refuted in Advaita Siddhi.

OM janmAdyasya yataH OM
-- establishes that Brahman is described *only* as a qualified Being(there being no sUtra describing an unqualified Brahman);

It takes little intellectual thinking to show that there can really be no creation in the changeless entity of Brahman as propounded and supported in the Chandogya Sruthi (6th Chapter) As this part has been dealt in detail in SatyaDarshanam, am not entering into its analysis over here.

OM IxaternAshabdaM OM
-- refutes the charge that Brahman is `avAchya' (by saying `na ashabdaM', which is exactly the same as `na avAchyaM');

Ikshate in 1.1.5 is interpreted by Sankara as the ability to “think” as mentioned in Chandogya as Tad Aikshatha & Aitareya as Sah Ikshatha – as the meaning goes, there is no interpretation or meaning as to show that “it is avaachyam”. Sankara interprets “na ashabdham” as prakrithi or pradhaana is not sentient as it cannot think & if it is said that “it can think”, that is against sruthi and not mentioned in the scripture. It is very well known that SHABDHAM and its usage in the Vedas are to show the sruthi and not one’s own capability of hearing. Mundaka clearly states that “Yad tad adrishyam agraahyam” etc. Kena clearly mentions that Brahman is beyond WORDS or HEARING ORGAN.

It is quite interesting to note over here that even Ramanuja takes the same meaning as Sankara & it is only Madhva and the dvaitins who take the meaning of “ashabdam” as differently. Again if the sruthi wanted to say that Brahman is not beyond hearing, then it would have used the word “srutham” which is used in Chandogya Upanishad 6th chapter – instead it uses Ashabdham – as we all know, Shadbha is one of the six pramaanas accepted by Vedanta & this pramana termed as Shabdham is also accepted by the Naiyyaayikaas.

It is really sad that the Dvaitins take Brahma Sutra as the final authority which is against Vyaasa’s own statement that “TAT TU SAMANVAYAAT” – “that by harmony is shown that Brahman is the import of all scriptural statements” which clearly shows that Brahma Sutra is critically analyzing the Upanishads which should have the final authority. Thus the Dvaitins forget this and give more importance to Brahma Sutras than to the Upanishads. But contrary to this, Advaita depends on the Upanishads as the final authority and also gives Brahma Sutra its due importance.

OM bhedavyapadeshAt.h OM
OM aMsho nAnAvyapadeshAt.h OM
OM pR^ithagupadeshAt.h OM
-- et cetera could not be clearer in stating difference;

OM saMbhogaprAptiritichenna vaisheshhyAt.h OM
-- says that Brahman does not experience as the jIva, raising a questionmark on how the two could be identical;

OM anupapattestu na shArIraH OM
-- says even more clearly that Brahman is not the embodied, such identitybeing implausible;

OM jagadvyApAravarjam.h OM
-- denies the identity of the individual and Brahman even after theformer's release, by ruling out any applicability to the individual of thedefinition of Brahman as Creator, etc., stated earlier as `janmAdi asyayataH';

OM vaidharmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h OM
-- clearly refutes the theory of Gaudapada, et al., that the world ofwaking is akin to a dream.

The above other sutra statements will be analyzed later as the limited intellect hasn’t learnt the Brahma Sutras except the first sutras and some other sutras. The last sutra doesn’t really refute Gaudapada’s statement but in fact acknowledges it. Vidyaranya clearly says in Panchadashi that “Tatha svapne atra vedhyam tu na sthiram jaagare sthiram” – “the difference between Svapna and Jagrat is that in Svapna things are not staying for long but in waking it stays for a longer period” --- this statement is an empirical one and in no way can show that dream and waking is not akin or similar.

Brahma Sutra is considered as the Nyaaya Prasthana in Vedanta – and since it uses logic, we cannot assume or take it for granted that Vyaasa overlooked the logic which Gaudapada could clearly find out.

Our own very experience shows that both are same – both are changing as Sri Krishna himself accepts “anityam asukham lokam”. Gaudapada also anticipates this objection or Vidyaranya’s statement and therefore says “if there is another dream world inside the dream world, the first dream world will seem to be sthiram or long with respect to the inner or the second dream world”.

Other sUtra-s also state the Brahman and the jIva in highly contrastingterms, such as the former being Universal, All-encompassing, and thelatter, minute, atomic.
In fact, B N K Sharma observes in some placesthat the Advaitins themselves admit that a not a single sUtra can be foundto directly support any of their theories! What Advaita one finds inShankara's "commentary" belongs there only; it does not originate in theoriginal text that he is allegedly commenting upon. Which is perhaps whythe Br. Su. per se is not taken as an important source-document in Advaita(for example, Advaitins do not quote sUtra-s to prove points of theirdoctrine), other sources like Gaudapada being given preference. Veryprobably, Shankara would have preferred to ignore the Br. Su. altogetherin formulating his doctrine (as Gaudapada did), but he realized that thetext had gained an unquestioned prestige and dominance by his time, so hecould not do so and expect to be taken for a serious Vedantin.

Even so,one must observe that the charge of fraud for his statement:
yathA chAyamarthaH sarveshhAM vedAntAnAM tathA vayamasyAM shArIrakamImAMsAyAM pradarshaishhyAmaH
-- is beyond refutation, as the statement clearly claims to do somethinghe could not, viz., show that the Br. Su. supported his world-view.

Here we find a major difference between Advaita and Dvaita. As mentioned earlier but still stressing again, Advaita or Vedanta is not Brahma Sutra but Vedanta is the theory present in the Upanishads. Brahma Sutra is only a logical analysis of Vedanta continued in the scriptures of Upanishads. Thus if a person takes resort to Brahma Sutras without taking into account sruthi – gives more importance or primary importance to Brahma Sutras than to the Upanishads, that system itself cannot be claimed to be a Vedanta system. This is what Advaita refrains from doing – when the scripture itself is clear, then why the need for a logical analysis through the Brahma Sutras which is very crypt and terse that a single sutra can be taken to mean 100s of things. But what Shrisha Rao says over here is wrong because Advaita never neglects Brahma Sutras. This becomes very clear when a seeker understands that the Advaitic commentary on the Upanishads have been done by Sankara, tika of Anandagiri, UpanishadBrahma Yogin, Vidyaranya and Sankarananda. Other than these, no advaitin has tried to write a commentary on the Upanishads but Brahma Sutra has a vast literature on it by Advaitins – it will require more than a life time to even just read the entire literature or sub-commentary sets on Brahma Sutras written by Advaitins. Thus Advaitins have never neglected B S (in short for Brahma Sutras) but they give it its due credit only and not keep it higher than Upanishads.

Yes, Brahma Sutras should also point out the ultimate reality which it very clearly brings out – if a person is unable to find Advaita in the Brahma Sutras it is only because he is wearing the spectacle of another system & thereby cannot see Advaita in B S. And no advaitin says that Brahma Sutra doesn’t clearly mention about Advaita --- this is a wrong statement of B N K Sharma.

As we have already analyzed in the reply to Koushik about creation of the world – the very second sutra that “creation came from Brahman – that is Brahman who is the cause of the world”, here clearly ajaathivaada or Advaita is mentioned. We have already analyzed this but just to say, Brahman alone was there, then how come the world came from Brahman --- Brahman is blissful whereas the world is sorrowful (as Sri Krishna says Anityam asukham lokam) – how can sorrow come from a blissful object? How can the changing world come from changeless Brahman? What about the changeless Brahman desire to create? Was there a desire? Why the desire when Brahman is perfect? The answer that “it is his leela” is wrong because for leela also there should be a desire and that makes Brahman imperfect which is contradictory to its own nature of “perfect” or BHOOMA as Chandogya Sruthi clearly says. Thus here there is both advaita in the form of ajaathivaada. Again any effect is only a name and form of the cause – any name and form is only an illusion & therefore again clearly advaita from empirical viewpoint is mentioned here.

Thus when it is clearly mentioned – even though not directly but indirectly (B S is a logical work & logic always will never be direct), to say that there is no Advaita & Sankara cannot claim that he is commenting on Advaita and Sankara’s Advaita is only in his works is foolishness & these statements are what we can call as “passion outpourings of the heart” – and substantiating with wrong or incomplete logic.

An acharya Sachidanandendra Saraswathi, who is the founder of Adhyatma Prakaashana Karyalaya in Holenarsipur, Karnataka has very clearly in his works proved that Advaita is not Sankara’s theory as has Kanchi Mahaperiyavaal about Sankara siddhanta --- SS (Sachidanandendra Saraswathi) in one of his works quotes Sankara’s bhashya on BS to show that during Sankara’s time there were no dvaitins or vishistadvaitins or any other systems – only Advaitins were there who differenced in the outlook or approach towards the reality from empirical viewpoint.

It is interesting to see here that Brahma Siddhi was written by one Mandana Misra who was an Advaitin and he clearly refutes theory of BHEDHA and proves that “difference” can never be proved or established --- and this Mandana Misra is refuted by Sankara as well as Sureswaracharya in his Naishkarmya Siddhi and other works (not complete refutation but refutation of some of the concepts in the empirical viewpoint of Mandana Misra).

Thus Advaita is not a creation of either Gaudapada or Sankara but it is the eternal theory found in the Upanishads and experience of Mahatmas from time immemorial.

Coming back to the charge of crypto-Buddhism -- although, as Dr. Sharmapoints out, the treatment in the tattvodyota+TIkA is perhaps the mostextensive, I am not familiar with it (Srinivasa Varakhedi did quote partsof the tattvodyota last month), and would like to present instead the onefound in the bR^ihad.hbhAshhya (as commented upon in the bhAvabodhasubcommentary of Sri Raghuttama Tiirtha).
To my mind, while this may be alaconic treatment of the subject of the identity of shUnyavAda andmAyAvAda, it is a complete one even so, and it is only necessary for oneto look at the relevant subcommentary, parts of which I quote. Under the passage `na tatra rathA na rathayogA na panthAno', etc.(VI-3-10) of the Upanishad, our commentator says (in part):
na cha sukhaduHkhAdermithyAtve kiJNchinmAnam.h
`yAthAtathyo.arthAn.h vyadadhAchchhAshvatIbhyaH samAbhyaH' (IshA. 8), `asatyamapratishhThaM te jagadAhuranIshvaraM (bha. gI. XVI-8),
`vaidhyarmyAchcha na svapnAdivat.h' (bra. sU. II-2-29)
ityAdivachanaviruddhAchcha

Then, too, there is not the least proof that experiences of joy and suffering are illusory. This is also opposed to statements such as "for eternal time, the Lord has ordained all objects in their real forms (yAthA tathyo arthAn.h vyadadhAt.h); "they (the evil-minded) say that the world is illusory, unfounded, and without a Lord"; "also on account of the differences in characteristics [the world is not unreal] as those of dream, etc."

I believe everyone would have gone through AtmaRahasyam commentary on Isha Upanishad or atleast sankara’s interpretation where the line of yAthA tathyo arthAn.h vyadadhAt.h
is interpreted as “assigns eternal time as is right or deserved”. And even if the opponent’s meaning is taken, advaita never disproves it but only says that empirically it is right but from the ultimate viewpoint, it is not correct. Thus there is no fault or opposition to such statements from advaita’s viewpoint.

About experiences of joy and suffering as illusory, will be taken up in the next posting on the same.

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavada and Mayavaada - 1

2006-05-20T07:03:00.000-07:00

HARI AUM
Humble prostrations to all.

It has been long since typing of this mail was started – it is only today that am able to send it to the forum. Regret for the delay in coming up with this set of mails.

It would always be better if the criticisms that are raised against Advaita Vedanta are analyzed – this will clearly bring out the conclusion that the criticisms are based on wrong understandings of the very system of Advaita or those are knowingly-posed-criticisms (by knowingly stating the position of the advaitin wrongly). Hence here is a humble effort to analyze the criticisms of Shrisha Rao in the links that had been sent in the previous mail.

It is very well understood that everyone will be busy with work (hectic schedules) and hence going through the original article itself might not be possible so what to speak about the critical analysis of the article? But still here is a humble effort towards the same so that this limited intellect’s understanding (whether it is wrong or right) is known.

Will try to split the analysis of the five parts of the articles into at least 10 articles so that there is an interest to at least go through the analysis of the article (the human mind runs away when it sees some article very big or huge unless there is so strong desire to know the content).

The comments will be in black colour whereas the original article from the site will be in blue colour.

A starting point for such an inquiry might well be the `History of theDvaita School of Philosophy' by B.N.K. Sharma; specifically, pp. 144, etseq., of the second edition. Some quotes from there which may be ofinterest are:
First of all, B N K Sharma is neither Vachaspathi Mishra nor Appayya Dikshitar to have written works on all the various systems present during their times. Hence his view cannot be considered as an open minded approach towards a subject. It obviously is diluted and seen through the spectacle of Dvaita Vedanta and hence the verdict also has to be allied towards Dvaita Vedanta which is one of the many schools raising the criticism that Advaita and Buddhism are one and the same.

On the contrary, Sri Harsha, the author of Khandana Khanda Khadyam specifically devotes a section to show that Advaita is different from the Buddhist system of Madhyamaka or shoonyavada. This is very important because the work is mainly a refutation of the Nyaaya doctrines & hence it is only in this part of the work that the author concentrates on his own system of Advaita. He convincingly shows the difference between shoonyavaada and advaita there (if possible will try to get the exact translation in the author’s own words).

All the authors of Advaita clearly state that there is an ultimate reality which is one without a second – a VASTHU (vasthu is that which is existent and not essenceless like the shoonyam of madhyamaka school). They again and again assert the existence of the real VASTHU which is termed as Brahman or CHIT or ATMAN – hence equating this system with the system which says that everything ends up in shoonya is utter ignorance. Madhyamaka school says that when the differentiation or dualities vanish, there will be void or nothing present whereas Advaita clearly mentions that when dualities vanish, there will be the non-dual reality of Brahman existing (it cannot be said as either existing or non-existing because there is nothing apart from it to speak about existence & its very nature of existence). The non-dual existence state is experienced by all at the time of deep sleep. All scriptural statements that the dvaitin might raise to show that in deep sleep the Ishwara embraces the jeeva and that state is not non-dual is contradictory even to sruthi, yukthi and anubhava also.

Let us analyze this:
Brihadaranyaka clearly spends at least 8 slokas to show that in the state of deep sleep there is SEER present as non-dual but he doesn’t vanish. It clearly mentions “when there is no other thing, what to see”. The Upanishad says that “in that state, the Seer doesn’t cease to exist but he exists as the Seer never ceases to exist, the light of seeing or sight always is there for the seer”. Here light of seeing or sight can be traced back to mean as Consciousness – that which shines all other things. Sight becomes manifest only when there are objects but when objects are not there also, sight is there. This is what the scripture says that “the Seer doesn’t cease to exist nor his sight --- he doesn’t see anything because there is nothing other than him to see in that state”. The scriptural statement is pretty clear here & simple Sanskrit. Instead if it is twisted, then the fault lies with the wrong interpreters alone.

Let’s take logic now to show that even though there are no objects, the Subject can exist. One objection which the site mentions is that Consciousness cannot exist without any objects --- this is what Ramanuja also says many times in his Sri Bhashya on Brahma Sutra. But this is wrong. Let’s take the example of a lamp to prove this. The Lamp always exist – even when there are no objects to illumine, the lamp exists. Isn’t this so???? This is what the Advaitin says. But on the contrary, what Dvaitin says is that “when objects are not there, Consciousness also doesn’t exist” – this is equivalent to saying that “when there are no objects to illumine, there is no light” – “when there are no objects on earth, the Sun doesn’t exist or doesn’t express its shine”. Doesn’t this simple logic itself prove that the dvaitin is completely wrong over here.

Let’s take experience or anubhava now: we all experience our own existence in deep sleep. We also experience the absence of any object in that state. The Dvaitin will raise objection here that “ishwara exists in that state embracing the jeeva”. This is foolishness and wrong because if there is ishwara, one should experience him. It is as good as telling that there is the computer in front of me but I don’t see it!!!! Isn’t it foolishness??? Experience clearly shows that there is nothing other than one’s own existence in deep sleep – because if there are anything else present then it would be seen or experienced.

Putting this into an inference or anumaana
There is nothing other than Existence or Consciousness in deep sleep
Because if there was something, it would have been experienced
as a pot (is experienced)

This clearly shows that there is no Ishwara in deep sleep who is apart from the jeeva or Atman or Self. The Sruthi cannot prove this point here because previously itself sruthi has been shown to have supported the view that there is no duality in deep sleep (the Brihadaranyaka 4.3.23 – 4.3.30 clearly mention this).

Thus sruthi, yukthi and anubhava clearly show that Consciousness can exist without any objects. If this is so, then all the major objections of the Dvaitin that Brahman of Advaita is Shoonyam of Madhyamaka vanishes

Long before Madhva, the Advaitins had been suspected of inward sympathies and leanings towards Buddhism. Advaita was openly denounced as Buddhism in disguise by such early writers as Bhaskara, Parthasarathi Misra, Yadavaprakasa, and Ramanuja. From early days, Advaitins have been vehemently protesting that theirs was certainly _not_ a Buddhism. The prejudice and antipathy to[wards] Advaita was very strong in Madhva's days.
It is not to be wondered if he chose to exploit this prevailing antipathy of his times, to the Advaita, both in learned quarters and among the people to further the interests of his new system. What is _important_, however, is that unlike most of his predecessors, he took it upon himself to substantiate his criticism against Advaita, in this respect, _with chapter and verse_, in his Tattvodyota and to a lesser extent, elsewhere. (pp. 144-145, emphases as shown; many footnotes in original not shown)

Always there is prone to be allegations from rival quarters. Bhaskara formulated the bheda abhedha school of Vedanta and Ramanuja propounded the Vishista Advaita school. Their school would have been invalid or not used by people unless there is some strong criticism of the already existing and strengthened Advaita Vedanta school. Therefore this criticism of calling Advaita as PRACCHHANNA BAUDHA or veiled budhist is completely out of selfish motive of establishing one’s own system.

The same allegation can be directed against both Madhva and Ramanuja by stating that they are pracchanna tarkikas or veiled logicians. This becomes very clear when it is remembered that Sri Bhashya spends a lot of effort in trying to prove Sankara’s system is wrong through strong logic. This high-end logic or hair-splitting logic as per the Navya Nyaaya system is also used by Madhva and his followers of Jaya Teertha and Vyaasa Teertha instead of directly taking resort to sruthi or scriptural statements. This is very well known by the ATAT TVAM ASI interpretation of the Chandogya Mahavakya TAT TVAM ASI when all the prior acharyas to Madhva have taken the wording to be TAT TVAM ASI only and not ATAT TVAM ASI.

And this ATAT TVAM ASI is proved through grammar and logic (again logic) as the upanishadic statement says “Sah Atmaa tat tvam asi” --- Atmaatat tvam asi can be interpreted as Atma tat tvam asi or atma atat tvam asi.

and: Until their (Madhva's and Jayatiirtha's) arguments are convincingly refuted, no philosophical value could be attached to mere sentimental protests against the equation of Advaita and Buddhism, by ancient or modern scholars. (footnote 2, p. 145)

There is nothing more to prove here as Sankara and others have clearly mentioned this in their works. When Sri Harsha has clearly shown the difference, Vidyaranya has shown and Madhusudana Saraswathi has shown, still if it is maintained that it is not shown, then it can be only that “the final verdict has been laid and reasons are put forth to prove that verdict”

Any seeker who is open minded can go through the explanations of various acharyas by studying both the systems and he will come to the conclusion that there is a vast difference between both madhyamaka and Advaita Vedanta. Any seeker open minded can go through the below analysis & then determine the right view is on whose part.

An important thing to be remembered here is that “there is neither question nor answer in Advaita” as everything is one alone. All these analysis are ways of removing the doubts so that the seeker can progress to realize the ultimate reality of non-dual Consciousness.

As Swayamprakaasha yathi says in his Rasa abhivyanjika commentary on Advaita Makarandam
Nityam nirantharaanandam chitghanam brahma nirbhayam
Sruthyaa tarkaanubhootibhyaam aham asmi advayam sadaa

That which is eternal, blissful, Conscious, Brahman and without any fear (as there is nothing apart from it to fear) – that non-dual Self I am who is proved as non-dual by scriptures, logic and experience at all times.

Dr. Sharma appears to feel that there exists no possibility of asubstantive (serious and non-sentimental) rebuttal to the charge ofcrypto-Buddhism, and for what it is worth, I myself have failed to comeacross any Advaitic works that defend that doctrine from it (if someoneknows of such, I'd be very grateful to receive the information).

Is it so???? When SriHarsha has clearly denied it in Khandana Khanda Khadyam and when Vidyaranya clearly refutes the shoonyavadins, how is it right to state that “I haven’t come across any Advaitic works that defend that doctrine from it”? It only shows the narrow mind and not wanting to really accept that Advaita is different from Shoonyavaada.

Just to mention here, advaita acharyas never use sentimentalism while refuting other systems – neither do they use abusive language. Instead there can be quotes directly from Dr. Sharma’s books about sentimentalism. For example, in the book “Advaita Siddhi vs Nyaayaamrita” of B N K Sharma, Sharma says that advaitic syllabus has been used in many universities in India whereas dvaitic works are not part of the syllabus – he goes on to say that the university people should look into this matter seriously and include dvaita also in the syllabus….. Now, with an open-mind, doesn’t this statement clearly show sentimentalism??? J This is just a single instance & there can be many other quotes which will show that it is dvaitins who take resort to sentimentalism whereas Advaitins starting from Gaudapada and Sankara & other acharyas have never used sentimentalism in their works --- and the answering of the rival critics that Advaita is the same as shoonyavada, various acharyas have resorted to logical analysis and sruthi analysis rather than sentimentalism – a person if he reads the Kanchi acharyal’s words on the same issue from www.advaita-vedanta.org site will clearly understand this.

Another statement of Sharma is “Advaita only creates more problems than it can ever think or claim of solving” – this statement is made in the same book of Sharma quoted in the above paragraph. This statement first shows the respect that Sharma gives for other philosophies. Secondly it shows that he is not at all open-minded but instead he already has the impression or decision that “advaita is wrong”. Thirdly, I have read many advaita books --- original Sanskrit works as well as translations (the total number of books would range around 300-400 or even more) – but I have never ever come across any advaitin making a similar claim towards dvaita or vishista advaita or any other philosophy for that matter. Instead advaita accepts all other philosophies in the plane of empirical reality. This itself is more than sufficient to show that Sharma is not open-minded and hence his view cannot be accepted with any authority or even respect for that matter (Give respect, take respect – this has been the Vedic stand).

HARI AUM

PS: am trying to make the analysis into small parts so that everyone is able to at least go through it & if time permits, analyze it, bring forth doubts & discuss over the issues.

Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God

Shoonyavaada and Mayavaada - Introduction

2006-05-20T06:59:00.000-07:00

Hari AUM
Prostrations to all.

The teachings of Buddha are collectively termed as Buddhism. As time passed, Buddha’s teachings were also interpreted in different ways & thereby various systems of Buddhism itself were created. The main two systems of Buddhism can be said to be Shoonyavaada or madhyamaka school which was propounded by Acharya Nagarjuna and Vijnaanavaada or yogaachara school of Kshanika Vijnaanavaadins.

Kumarila Bhatta (a purva mimamsaka) and Udayanaacharya (a naiyyaayika) thoroughly proved that Buddhism is baseless and the concepts of Buddhism are wrong. Once this was done, Sankara then re-instated the Advaita Vedanta system propounded in the Upanishads from time immemorial. But the various Vedanta acharyas (mainly the Vaishnava Acharyas like Ramanuja and Madhva) after Sankara started calling Sankara a pracchana bauddha (veiled Buddhist). The reason for this is misunderstanding of the two systems of Advaita and Shoonyavaada or Yogaachara. Another important reason is establishing their own system by falsifying or proving the other system to be false!!!! A seeker need not be surprised at this approach in the Sanaatana Dharma which was full of compassion or karuna for all other systems and beings in the world – because such acharyas claim that Siva is only a baddha jeeva whereas Vishnu or Narayana alone is the Supreme Lord based on some sruthi statements.

The theory of Madhyamaka school of Nagarjuna is called Shoonyavaada because in it the ultimate reality is VOID – it is not existent but it is mere void. This void alone is the ultimate reality and the world that is seen is only a projection of the mind. This void is not a conscious entity like the Brahman in Advaita Vedanta. It is a state where there will be no person or no object. This is contrary to Advaita which states that Brahman or EXISTENCE is the ultimate reality and at that state there will be nothing but only SAT or EXISTENCE.

Even though there are clear demarcations and distinctions between the various Buddhist systems and Advaita Vedanta, but still the Vaishnava systems claim that both are equal. If a person of the stature of Jaya Teertha and Madhvacharya themselves try to dissect Advaita through wrong and misunderstood notions, what to speak about normal people putting up and upholding such views in the illusory world.

Another wrong notion which the Vaishnava school has towards Advaita is the terming of the philosophy as Mayavaada. This is completely wrong as Advaita doesn’t stop after explaining that Maya is the cause of the world. It goes further to say that Maya itself is an illusory power of the ultimate reality of Brahman which is the substratum of the illusion of Maya and its effect of the world. Thus Advaita doesn’t propagate Mayavaada but it propagates Brahmavaada alone. Maya is something very terse and complex in Advaita and it is meant as a temporary solution to the answer-seeking disciple who is in the initial stages of the spiritual path.

If people need to know really about Maya in Advaita, they need to go through the Maya Panchakam of Sankara or any such works of Advaita acharyas with an open mind (if there is no open mind, whatever will be seen will only be according to one’s perception and not the reality).

I was going through a website on the system of Dvaita propounded by Madhvacharya (www.dvaita.org). At that time, I came across a set of postings by one Shrisha Rao (one of the person who maintains the website) on the similarities between Shoonyavaada of Buddhism and Mayavada of Sankara (this is a wrong terming because Sankara never propounded Mayavada and neither did he start a new system of Advaita – Advaita is something which was ever-present and it was spread by Sankara through his activities and commentaries).

These articles might be a little bit confusing (as it is quoting from some of the works of Madhva and the sub commentaries on the same) but still it serves good for a seeker as when these wrong understandings are removed, then the advaita knowledge becomes more clear & the path to the spiritual goal of realization becomes very near.

Below are the links for the articles which are in five parts. All must necessarily read it (of course when there is time) and there need be no fear that one may get confused because AMMA and all the great Mahatmas with their works are always there to take us out of the confusions or doubts arising when these articles are read.

Shoonyavaada and Mayavaada
Part 1
http://www.dvaita.org/list/list_28/msg00076.html

Part 2
http://www.dvaita.org/list/list_28/msg00104.html

Part 3
http://www.dvaita.org/list/list_28/msg00106.html

Part 4
http://www.dvaita.org/list/list_28/msg00138.html

Part 5
http://www.dvaita.org/list/list_28/msg00184.html

The above links are about how the Dvaitins see the school of Advaita and the various schools of Buddhism. But this is just one phase of the issue or topic. The below link gives the interpretation and answer to the criticisms (in a very short manner) by an Advaitin named Vidyasankar Sundaresan in his web site www.advaita-vedanta.org. Even though the content here is very small but it is very well enough to show that Advaita is very much different from all the schools of Buddhism.

Advaita Vedanta site on similarity between Advaita and Buddhism

http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/avhp/gaudapada.html

The above link was about an advaitin who is closely associated with the Sringeri Math. Below is an article about how Kanchi Jagadguru Swami Chandrasekharendra Saraswathi takes the two schools of Advaita and Madhyamaka.

http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/series/shankara_sampradaya/sankara_sampradhayam-5.htm

The entire set of the description about Shankara sampradaya can be got below:

http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/series/shankara_sampradaya/sankara_sampradayam_top.htm

The advaita vedanta web site is a really good web site to start knowing about the various basic and conflicting topics in Advaita.

FAQs about Advaita: http://www.advaita-vedanta.org/avhp/ad_faq.html

Let me hope that there are no confusions after reading the above articles and if there are any we can discuss them over here so that such doubts are removed permanently.

HARI AUM
Thanks
Hariram
Let a moment not pass by without remembering God